2016
DOI: 10.7249/rr1236
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U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001--2014

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“…With Duterte's anti‐U.S. sentiments, China seized the opportunity to enter the realm of counterterrorism—an arena where the United States has a well‐established track record under its formal alliance with the Philippines (Robinson, Johnston, & Oak, , p. 114). Instead of fully relying on the Americans, the Philippines also received weapons and development aid from China.…”
Section: The Marawi Uprisingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With Duterte's anti‐U.S. sentiments, China seized the opportunity to enter the realm of counterterrorism—an arena where the United States has a well‐established track record under its formal alliance with the Philippines (Robinson, Johnston, & Oak, , p. 114). Instead of fully relying on the Americans, the Philippines also received weapons and development aid from China.…”
Section: The Marawi Uprisingmentioning
confidence: 99%