U. S. State Legislators' Opinions and Perceptions of Constituency Attitudes

Shirking the Initiative? The Effects of Statewide Ballot Measures on Congressional Roll Call Behavior

“…Thus, the information provided by statewide ballot measures may induce congressional lawmakers to be less likely to shirk and vote against their constituencies (Bender & Lott, 1996;Kalt & Zupan, 1984;Lott, 1987). Indeed, as we suggested at the outset, it is entirely possible that (at least some) lawmakers who are branded as "deviants" or "shirkers" merely posses imperfect information about the pol icy preferences of their home state (or district) voters (Hedlund & Friesema, 1972;Uslaner & Weber, 1979). Although our findings and causal explana tion have theoretical utility, methodologically our analysis is uniquely suited to address the question of shirking.…”

“…In assessing legislative shirk ing, many scholars who study legislative behavior readily admit that it is not particularly easy to determine if there is a gap between a legislator's actions and the median preference of his or her constituency (Burden, 2007;Uslaner, 1999). Moreover, researchers have found that legislators are often poor esti mators of their constituents' views on certain issues (Hedlund & Friesema, 1972;Uslaner & Weber, 1979). Thus, when assessing legislative shirking, most studies use proxies to measure the preferences of legislators' constituen cies (Kalt & Zupan, 1990;Lawrence, 2007;Lott, 1987;Poole & Romer, 1993;Rothenberg & Sanders, 2000; but see Garrett, 1999;Smith, 2001).…”

Crime Control Ideology among New York State Legislators

“…In reality, both the legislators and the public viewed the purpose of prisons, for first time offenders, as changing behavior. Political scientists Uslaner and Weber (1979) argue that state "legislators represent their perceptions of constituency opinion better than they do public opinion." Because legislators are a "poorly informed elite," Uslaner and Weber contend that lawmakers "misperceive public opinion more often than one might expect" (1979,563).…”

Rethinking Public Opinion in Penal Policymaking: Recommendations for Research

“…3 Empirical evaluations of policymaker perceptions of public opinion have suggested that political actors misperceive public opinion and are, therefore, ignorant of “true” or at least “well measured” public opinion (Bowers et al. 1994; Gottfredson and Taylor 1984; Johnson and Huff 1987; McGarrell and Sandys 1996; Pratt 2009, 58; Riley and Rose 1980; Uslaner and Weber 1979; Whitehead et al. 1999).…”

“…If the information [on public views] is not readily available, elites may not attempt to seek it out; if there is no indication that elites are listening, the public may not raise its collective voice loudly enough to be heard. Or perhaps there are so many voices saying different things that the elite either cannot make sense of the din or chooses only to listen to a select segment of the population (Uslaner and Weber 1979, 580).…”