UK devolution in the shadow of hierarchy? Intergovernmental relations and party politics

Abstract

Abstract:This article looks at the dynamics of intergovernmental relations in the context of UK devolution and how these have been affected by the more widespread occurrence of party incongruence since 2007. As predicted by the hypotheses in the introduction to this special issue, we first show how the asymmetric design of devolution is conducive to bilateral and weakly institutionalized intergovernmental relations, and how the asymmetric design of UK devolution has been perpetuated since devolution was implemented in 1999. Yet, although devolution (unlike federalism) implies a constitutional hierarchy between levels, in the second part of the article we demonstrate that UK governments have used their constitutional muscle with some restraint, in part for fear of losing electoral support and legitimacy among their electorates. Finally, although the absence of wide-scale intergovernmental conflict in the face of party incongruence is consistent with the third hypothesis of the introduction, we argue that this is not simply the result of the devolved state alone, but also of other institutional features and the presence of political context in which neither the UK government nor the devolved governments would benefit from a path which prioritizes intergovernmental conflict over cooperation.

Still better together? Purpose and power in intergovernmental councils in the UK

“…There is some scepticism on the part of the devolved administrations as to the effectiveness of the JMC as a forum for resolving disputes, in light of the asymmetry in intergovernmental relationships, and the dominant role of the UK Government (Swenden and McEwen, 2014). For example, the former First Minister of Northern Ireland, Peter Robinson, described the dispute resolution procedure as 'meaningless': 'At the end of the day, the Cabinet Office will decide whether the Treasury was right.…”

“…Welsh-UK intergovernmental relations have been conducted under conditions of party political incongruence since 2010. While this has coloured their formal and informal interactions, the constitutional dependence of the Welsh Government on the UK Government to exercise its legislative power was a source of frustration even under conditions of party congruence (Commission on Devolution in Wales, 2014; Swenden and McEwen, 2014).…”

“…One example is the so-called 'Finance Ministers' Quadrilateral' (FMQ), which brings together devolved Finance ministers with a UK Treasury Minister to discuss ongoing issues of common concern. The formula-based system of territorial finance and the absence of a system of equalization limit the need for formal ongoing multilateral intergovernmental coordination on financial matters, but the combined effects of vertical fiscal imbalance and fiscal austerity still produce periodic tensions over money (Gallagher, 2012;Swenden and McEwen, 2014). The FMQ normally meets three times per year, but did not meet at all for around three years as bilateral negotiations on finance took precedence (see below).…”

Quitter la PAC, comment et pour quoi faire ?

“…Les décisions à ce niveau ont des conséquences directes pour les agriculteurs britanniques, jusqu'ici habitués à devoir produire en respectant des minima réglementaires, à travers notamment la conditionnalité des aides PAC.Le gouvernement britannique a choisi de centraliser son processus d'adaptation au Brexit avec une Loi de Retrait de 2018, plutôt que de maintenir le principe de subsidiarité qui aurait potentiellement laissé trop de liberté aux administrations dévolues. Ce choix centralisateur a accentué la nature inégale des relations intergouvernementales britanniques, accordant un rôle prépondérant à l'Angleterre représentée par le gouvernement britannique(Swenden et McEwen, 2014). Cette loi a donc été une « reprise de contrôle » par Westminster face à deux turbulences, l'une environnementale (concernant les relations commerciales extérieures) et l'autre scalaire (risque de divergence interne).Or cette centralisation touche des domaines directement liés à l'agriculture comme les normes environnementales, sanitaires et phytosanitaires ainsi que l'étiquetage agro-alimentaire(Engel et Petetin, 2018).…”