UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies

Østensen, Åse Gilje

doi:10.5334/bbn

Cited by 17 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…Global employment of PMSCs continues to expand as governments and non-state actors seek security services previously provided by governments. The UN notably increased spending on such firms from $44 million in 2009 to $76 million in 2010 (Ostensen, 2011). Moreover, states increasingly organize their militaries following the US model, including the use of operational contract support (Krishnan, 2008).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Governments, international organizations, and humanitarian organizations contract PMSCs for risk management, governance, and reconstruction services as well as traditional security tasks (Grant, 2013; Stoddard et al, 2008). Multiple peacekeeping operations use private firms to provide logistics and transportation as well as the delivery of aid (Ostensen, 2011: 38). The provision of government services may decrease incentives for violence and bolster support for the government.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, scholars have shown that PMSC employment impacts violence intensity (Petersohn, 2014), conflict duration (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2012), and military operational capabilities (Singer, 2003). Despite contractor malfeasances and failure to provide contracted duties that reduce military effectiveness (Dunigan, 2011), PMSC employment continues as states, international organizations, and humanitarian organizations contract a range of risk management, security and governance services (Grant, 2013; Ostensen, 2011; Stoddard et al, 2008). Chaotic conflict environments and limited government oversight can result in few objective success measures, weak country infrastructure, and limited penalties for failure.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Private military and security companies, contract structure, market competition, and violence in Iraq

Tkach

2017

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Conflict environments exacerbate an incentive dilemma between employers and private military and security companies (PMSCs). PMSCs seek to maximize profits, but employers seek to minimize expenses and maximize services. We argue that PMSCs are influenced by two complementary economic factors: contract structure and intra-sector competition. Contract structures are set by employers and establish compensation constraints and intra-sector competition identifies potential replacements. Both impact service delivery. We find that PMSCs with contract structures that lack performance incentives, even in the presence of competition, increase the likelihood of violence in Iraq. PMSCs that lacked intra-sector competition had a similar but smaller effect.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Private military and security companies, contract structure, market competition, and violence in Iraq

Tkach

2017

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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“…Journalistic sources, including Steve Fainaru’s Big Boy Rules , Patrap Chatterjee’s Halliburton ’ s Army , and Phil Miller’s Keenie Meenie , were consulted as well (Chatterjee 2009; Fainaru 2008; Miller 2020). In addition, we included studies focusing on particular actors or clients, including Ostensen’s investigation on UN contracting and Krahmann’s exploration of NATO contracting (Krahmann 2016; Ostensen 2011). We also drew from publications by (former) PMSCs, including Eeben Barlow’s Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds (Barlow 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Commercial Military Actor Database

Petersohn

Gottwick

Penel

et al. 2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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This article introduces the Commercial Military Actor Database (CMAD), a dataset able to support research on civil war and commercial military actors. First, the CMAD covers all civil wars from 1980 to 2016 across all of the world’s regions except Europe, which enables the investigation of long-term regional and global trends. Second, the CMAD encompasses the corporate market segment and mercenary outfits, which facilitates the analysis of how those actors have impacted conflicts differently. Third, containing detailed information about the relationships behind exchanges, the CMAD allows users to disaggregate market exchanges. Using the CMAD’s new data, we examined trends in the market for force, and demonstrate the data’s added value. We re-examining Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski’s study on how private military and security companies affect the duration of civil war. The findings show that the market’s influence on conflict can only be fully understood by including corporate and mercenary actors.

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“…1 They have been fuelled by reports of contractor fraud, waste and human rights abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan ( Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2011 ; House of Representatives, 2010 ). Nevertheless, a growing number of clients, including not only the United States, Canada, Britain and Germany, but also the United Nations, NATO and the European Union, consider PSCs to be legitimate actors who contribute significantly to global governance in regions of conflict ( Krahmann, 2016 ; Leander, 2013 ; Østensen, 2011a ; Spearin, 2008 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

From performance to performativity: The legitimization of US security contracting and its consequences

Krahmann

2017

Security Dialogue

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Discussions about the legitimacy of private security companies (PSCs) in multilateral military interventions abound. This article looks at how the United States has sought to legitimize the outsourcing of security services to PSCs through performance-based contracting and performance assessments. Both mechanisms aim to demonstrate the effective provision of publicly desirable outcomes. However, the immaterial and socially constructed nature of security presents major problems for performance assessments in terms of observable and measurable outcomes. Performance has therefore given way to performativity – that is, the repetitive enactment of particular forms of behaviour and capabilities that are simply equated with security as an outcome. The implications of this development for the ways in which security has been conceptualized, implemented and experienced within US interventions have been profound. Ironically, the concern with performance has not encouraged PSCs to pay increased attention to their impacts on security environments and civilian populations, but has fostered a preoccupation with activities and measurable capabilities that can be easily assessed by government auditors.

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UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

Private military and security companies, contract structure, market competition, and violence in Iraq

Private military and security companies, contract structure, market competition, and violence in Iraq

The Commercial Military Actor Database

From performance to performativity: The legitimization of US security contracting and its consequences

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