Uncertainty, opportunistic behavior, and governance in construction projects: The efficacy of contracts

You, Jingya; Chen, Yongqiang; Wang, Wenqian; Shi, Chenxi

doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2018.03.002

Cited by 140 publications

(130 citation statements)

References 65 publications

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“…The owner and other project participants are peripheral nodes in the project networks, and they depend on the main contractor to deliver and receive information. This practice is fragmented, as each of the project participants follows their own procedures (Fakhimi et al 2017), and it increases asymmetric information and opportunistic behaviors (You et al 2018). In fact, all project stakeholders are required to share and receive project information through a unified information model.…”

Section: Effective Collaboration Among Project Participants Without Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint Contract–Function Effects on BIM-Enabled EPC Project Performance

Lee

Chong

et al. 2020

J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

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Engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contracting does not promote collaboration and thus, may not be suitable for building information modeling (BIM) projects. Joint-contract functions that combine contractual control, coordination, and contingency adaptability may positively influence the performance of these BIM-enabled projects. This study hypothesized that perceived fairness, calculative trust, relational trust, and positive outcomes of distrust influence the relationship between joint contract functions and BIMenabled project performance. It collected 252 observations from industry practitioners in EPC oil and gas projects and analyzed them using partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM). The results show no direct effect of joint-contract functions on BIM-enabled EPC project performance but do show significant total and indirect relationship effects that are influenced by perceived fairness and relational trust. The findings contribute to construction contracting research by empirically showing how formal contracts focusing on joint-contract functions can influence BIM-enabled EPC project performance. The current findings also shed light on appropriate contract framing for BIM-enabled EPC project stakeholders, an area not explored in the previous literature.

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Section: Effective Collaboration Among Project Participants Without Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint Contract–Function Effects on BIM-Enabled EPC Project Performance

Lee

Chong

et al. 2020

J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

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“…e incentive provision encourages the project participants to take actions that are beneficial to the overall interests of the project. Also, penalty provisions limit the behavior of the project participants to protect the overall interests of the project [24]. e third-party arbitration, oversight, and dispute resolution rights set out in the contract terms are considered terms of the control function [75].…”

Section: Moderating Effect Of Contractual Control Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…e assessment of relationship quality comprised four items (RQ1-RQ4) [40], and the megaproject success was measured by five items (PS1-PS5) [34]. In terms of moderating variables, the functions of complex contract terms in megaprojects were mainly regarded as three aspects [24]. According to You's research, the contractual control function consisted of four items (CR1-CR4), the coordination function was composed of five items (CN1-CN5), and the adaptation function comprised four items (AD1-AD4).…”

Section: Measurementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…CR1: e contract defines the rights of both parties specifically. [24] CR2: e contract specifically stipulates how the party awarding the contract monitors the contractor. CR3: e contract specifically stipulates the rights entitled to one party if the other party breaches the contract.…”

Section: Contractual Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, examining only the effect of contractual control function is insufficient. Except for control functions, the contract includes other important functions [22][23][24]. e effect of different contract functions on relationships should be analyzed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Connection between Relationship Quality and Megaproject Success: Moderating Role of Contractual Functions

Wang

Fang

2019

Advances in Civil Engineering

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Relational governance is critical to project success. The present study on relational governance fails to elaborate on the relation between relationship quality and project success. In line with social exchange theory, this paper presents an empirical research of Chinese megaprojects to explore the effect of social exchange factors on relationship quality. Particularly, this research investigated how mianzi (face) as a factor variable affects relationship quality in megaprojects. This work also divided contract functions into control, coordination, and adaptation to investigate the impact of these functions on the relationship between social exchange factors and mianzi (face) with relationship quality. Results corroborate the following points: (1) relationship quality has a significant effect on project success; (2) relationship quality is also significantly influenced by trust, reciprocity, commitment, and mianzi; and (3) regarding the moderating effects of contractual functions, the contractual control function has a positive influence on the relationship between trust, commitment, and relationship quality and has a negative influence on the relationship between mianzi and relationship quality. However, contractual control has no apparent effect on the relationship between reciprocity and relationship quality. The contractual coordination function has a positive effect on the relationship between trust, commitment, and relationship quality. The contractual adaptation function has a significant positive effect on the relationship between trust and relationship quality. These findings provide new insights into relationship governance, and suggestions for contractual function design are provided.

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Game analysis of social capital violations and government regulation in public–private partnership risk sharing

Wang

2023

Systems Engineering

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The public–private partnership (PPP) mode entails a variety of risks because the government, private enterprises, financial institutions, and other participants have different interests. To prevent private enterprise violations, dynamic government regulation of PPP risk‐sharing is necessary. Game theory is used here to examine the game behavior of government regulators, private enterprises, intermediary agencies, and the public in the stage of tracking management after the initial risk‐sharing of the project. Primarily, this study analyzes whether private enterprises provide fully compliant reporting and whether government departments check the information by investigating the behavioral motivations behind strategic choices. The primary contribution of this study was to construct a game model of government due diligence inspection under the condition of public participation in regulation. The results of simulations revealed the behavioral characteristics and stability of the participants of PPP in terms of decision‐making. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis between the state variables and several auxiliary variables was used to reveal the internal relationships of the participants’ strategic choices. This paper offers new insights into reducing violation behavior, protecting the public interest from harm, reducing government departments’ regulatory costs, and promoting effective regulation with public participation.

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Uncertainty, opportunistic behavior, and governance in construction projects: The efficacy of contracts

Cited by 140 publications

References 65 publications

Joint Contract–Function Effects on BIM-Enabled EPC Project Performance

Joint Contract–Function Effects on BIM-Enabled EPC Project Performance

Connection between Relationship Quality and Megaproject Success: Moderating Role of Contractual Functions

Game analysis of social capital violations and government regulation in public–private partnership risk sharing

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