Unconventional Diplomacy in Southern Africa

Renwick, Robin

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-25399-9

Cited by 39 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…While South African approval was never sought for anything the British government did -and indeed they very clearly disapproved of most of it -South African acquiescence had to be secured if its influence was not to be exerted against proceeding with the elections'. 68 Soames' advisers also realised that Walls 'regarded the presence of these forces as a guarantee of South African support.' 69 It was not simply the 90 South African MPVs which had been loaned to the election effort.…”

Section: Dealing With the South Africansmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Man on the Spot: Christopher Soames and Decolonisation of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia

Onslow¹

2013

Britain and the World

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In the historiography of British imperialism, the role of the ‘man on the spot’ has been identified as an important impulse to the imperial project, and as a key instigator of decision making. Equal attention should be directed to assessing the contribution of ‘the man on the spot’ in the final unravelling of empire. Old fashioned diplomacy and diplomats should not be airbrushed from history as key individuals navigated the rocky terrain of decolonisation. The fraught negotiations at Lancaster House on Rhodesia-Zimbabwe's constitutional arrangements for independence between September-December 1979 were only part of the delicate process of resolution of the intractable UDI problem. The four months of Christopher Soames’ administration as the last British Governor comprised the second vital stage of implementation, particularly given the presence of four competing armed forces in Rhodesia at the time, all of whom had external backers.

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Section: Dealing With the South Africansmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Man on the Spot: Christopher Soames and Decolonisation of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia

Onslow¹

2013

Britain and the World

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“…And when Mugabe proved intransigent at the 1979 Lancaster House conference, because he preferred military victory to a negotiated settlement, Machel, through one of his aides, Fernando Honwana, firmly counselled Mugabe to agree a settlement at Lancaster House, because Mozambique could no longer meet the economic costs of hosting ZANU. 121 Peter Carrington, who chaired the conference, and others in the Rhodesian and ZANU delegations credited Frelimo's intervention as having guaranteed a successful conclusion to the Lancaster House talks. 122…”

Section: Ordinary Mozambicans and Zanla Militantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nationalism and Exile in an Age of Solidarity: Frelimo–ZANU Relations in Mozambique (1975–1980)

Munguambe

2017

Journal of Southern African Studies

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This article contributes to our knowledge on the intricate relations between host governments and liberation movements and on the workings of transnational military partnerships in the anti-colonial struggles of the 1970s, through an examination of the political and military relationship between Mozambique's Frelimo (host) and Zimbabwe's ZANU liberation movement. There is a dearth of critical perspectives on the nature of host-liberation movement relations, more so from the point of view of hosts. The article begins to shed light on un-researched Frelimo evaluations of its relationship with ZANU. I utilise the perspectives of Mozambican political elites and non-elites to argue that Frelimo's support for ZANU was partly motivated by feelings of genuine solidarity. Frelimo-ZANU relations were frosty at first because Frelimo regarded ZANU as an inauthentic liberation movement. ZANU won Frelimo over by demonstrating cogent commitment to armed struggle. However, improved Frelimo-ZANU relations were characterised by disagreements over guerrilla tactics, ZANU guerrillas' objections to Frelimo soldiers' relationships with Zimbabwean women at the warfront, and the unpragmatic approaches of some ZANU elements towards the possibility of a negotiated independence for Zimbabwe. In addition to Frelimo's backing, ZANU received support from ordinary Mozambican citizens, particularly those who lived in areas along the Rhodesia-Mozambique border. The support of Mozambican citizens for ZANU was encouraged by Frelimo's revolutionary ideology and by the common ancestry, language and culture of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans living in the border zones. The case of Frelimo and ZANU underlines the point that hosts' influence on liberation movements' internal politics must be seen as limited by the interests and agency of liberation movements themselves. But Frelimo held decisive authority on the right to withdraw support on its territory, which it used as an inducement on ZANU to agree a negotiated independence settlement in 1979. 2

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“…13 The diplomats also sent Soames to Rhodesia prematurely 'to step up pressure on the parties [to Lancaster House] to agree' a settlement. 14 Acland took advantage of the diplomats' negotiating tactic by securing seats on Soames' Rhodesia bound airplane for the CMF command. The CMF leadership therefore arrived in Rhodesia on 12 December, which was earlier than envisaged, affording it added time to fully appreciate the gravity of Operation AGILA, before the Lancaster House agreement was signed on 21 December.…”

Section: Britain's Intramural Ceasefire Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…71 Similarly, Renwick extols the FCO's Rhodesia department and Powell, in particular, who he describes as combining 'qualities of intelligence, imagination and determination rare in any bureaucracy, anywhere'. 72 In opposition, the military took a dim view of the FCO's institutional capacity. For instance, in a SITREP to the MOD on 4 March 1980, Acland sarcastically belittled the FCO because unlike the MOD, it lacked a Staff College that knowledgeably trained future commanding officers and provided institutional memory: On 23 December [1979] when discussing with my [CMF] staff some of the extraordinary problems that faced us and suggesting that they might very well be fed in to test the keen young officers at the Staff College we idly wondered what sort of problems the FCO would look at if they had a Staff College.…”

Section: The Diplomats and Military: Logics Of Strained Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Soldiers contra diplomats: Britain’s role in the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia ceasefire (1979–1980) reconsidered

Tendi

2015

Small Wars & Insurgencies

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This article reexamines part of the literature on Britain's role in the December 1979 to March 1980 Zimbabwe/Rhodesia ceasefire. The ceasefire ushered in an era of peace after a protracted internal war and it was an integral part of the transition from colonial white minority rule, towards black majority independence. Scholars present Britain's success in brokering and monitoring the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia ceasefire as the result of its judicious and accordant management of the road to peace. However, this article argues that in fact deep internal divisions plagued the British managers of the ceasefire. Internal divisions centered on authority struggles between diplomats and military actors, conflicting personalities, discordant approaches to and goals in the ceasefire, and inter-institutional rivalry between the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. The article concludes that Britain only managed the ceasefire effectively because its military's independence, political nous and competence ultimately prevailed over the injudicious views and machinations of diplomats.

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Unconventional Diplomacy in Southern Africa

Cited by 39 publications

References 0 publications

The Man on the Spot: Christopher Soames and Decolonisation of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia

The Man on the Spot: Christopher Soames and Decolonisation of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia

Nationalism and Exile in an Age of Solidarity: Frelimo–ZANU Relations in Mozambique (1975–1980)

Soldiers contra diplomats: Britain’s role in the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia ceasefire (1979–1980) reconsidered

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