Understanding Religion, Governing Religion

Abstract

Cécile Laborde has argued that the freedom we think of as ‘freedom of religion’ should be understood as a bundle of separate and relatively independent freedoms. This chapter criticizes that approach by pointing out that it is insufficiently sensitive to facts about the sorts of entities that liberal states are. It argues that states have good reasons to mould phenomena such as religion into easily governable monoliths. If this is a problem from the normative point of view, it is not due to descriptively inadequate accounts of religion, but a problem with a lack of realism about the sort of institutions states are. The chapter’s conclusion is a three-way disjunction: either one must reckon with liberal states’ historically determined limitations in the management of changing social phenomena, or one should direct one’s frustration at the marriage of liberalism and the state, or the very existence of states is normatively problematic.

Taking rulers' interests seriously: The case for realist theories of legitimacy

“…A second practical function of ruler-interested theories might be to predict the courses of action that rulers are likely to take in the future (Cross 2021c; Rossi 2017; Williams 2005: chapter 12). Showing that rulers need to do X in order to retain their legitimacy gives us some reason to think that it is likely that they will, in fact, do X.…”

“…An example of this kind of argument is Enzo Rossi's realist analysis of the concept of religious freedom (Rossi 2017). Rossi argues that a common objection to the liberal idea of religious freedom – that it presupposes a privatised Western-centric model of religion – neglects the fact that liberal states need to mould religions into largely privatised entities in order to retain their legitimacy, and have historically done this with some degree of success.…”

Being realistic and demanding the impossible

“…And, importantly, the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable legitimation stories is not moral but epistemic: ideological legitimation stories just aren't what they purport to be, so epistemic caution requires us to disregard them, as we will see in 3.2 below (Prinz & Rossi, ) . Recent realist work in this vein includes critiques of the ideology of Rawlsian political liberalism (Finlayson, ; Freyenhagen, ) as well as historically informed, genealogical critiques of specific policy proposals or normative commitments (Prinz & Rossi, forthcoming ; Rossi, ; Rossi & Argenton, ; Rossi & Prinz, forthcoming ). Charles Mills's influential critique of the ideological nature of mainstream political philosophy's methodology may also be read in this light (Mills, ).…”

From Practice to Principle and Back: Applying a New Realist Method to the European Union’s Democratic Deficit

“…Recently, however, realists have turned their attention to substantive issues (e.g. Jubb, 2015b ; Rossi, 2017 ; Sleat, 2016b ). These explorations offer little systematic guidance.…”