Understanding the Legitimacy of Armed Groups: A Relational Perspective

Abstract

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Explaining the Kurdish Democratic Union Party's Self-Governance Practices in Northern Syria, 2012–18

“…Normalization at the local level will require that the PYD take genuine steps to ensure fair representation, voice for political opponents and respect for civil rights. This requires governance structures that rely less on simple compliance in favour of consent-based rule over civilians who endorse the ‘appropriateness of the rules being enforced’ (Podder 2017: 687). Kurdish-inhabited regions in Syria have a long experience of Marxist and leftist parties.…”

“…A demonstrated commitment to democratization and good governance has increasingly been recognized by self-determination scholars as a prerequisite for unrecognized states to obtain membership in the international system of states (Broers 2014; Caspersen 2012; Clark 2001; Jo 2015; Seymour 2017; Voller 2015: 612). The same logic can be extended to rebel claims for non-secessionist autonomy, where some demonstration of institution-building or effective governance capacity is seen as necessary by armed rebels to be seen as effective rulers (Podder 2017; Policzer 2006; Sindre 2016).…”

Peaceful Borders and Illicit Transnational Flows in the Americas

“…First, there is often an asymmetry in the level and forms of governance across the neighboring countries, as a function of different legal systems and levels of economic development, corruption, and institutionalization (or lack thereof) of the rule of law; this is called "jurisdictional arbitrage." Second, the VNSAs that are typically stereotyped as "forces of disorder" might play sometimes positive functions of governance, like policing and providing essential social services, when these functions are neglected or ignored by the relevant state actors that are unable or unwilling to perform them due to their weakness or ineptitude (see Podder 2017). Third, the official actors that embody the government and should therefore provide governance might be corrupted, criminal, and might collaborate with transnational nonstate actors to the extent that it might be difficult at times to differentiate between criminalized state actors and other private, nonstate actors engaged in illicit transnational activities.…”

Concepts of Legitimacy: Congruence and Divergence in the Afghan Conflict

“…Some scholars have indeed found evidence for the positive effects of the practice of social contract and service provision on rebels' legitimacy (Grynkewich 2008, Flanigan 2008, Förster 2015. However, others have challenged the unidirectional view of legitimacy implicit in the concept of the social contract, emphasising instead the relational character of legitimacy, where every legitimation process is understood as an interdependent bargain between ruler and ruled (Malthaner 2015, Bruijn and Both 2017, Podder 2017, Schoon 2017, Worrall 2017. Again others have highlighted the importance of ideology within rebel governance and the role of ideational elements of legitimacy next to utilitarian considerations (Mampilly 2015, Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, Suykens 2015, Kalyvas 2015.…”