it examines the oft-neglected linkages between rebel governance and post-conflict legitimacy. Findings highlight three pitfalls of mainstreaming non-state roles without sufficient analysis of the sources of legitimacy underlying rebel governance frameworks. First, by drawing upon the functions and legitimacy of other non-state actors rather than the rebel group itself, an artificial image of state-building can be projected. Second, due to the fragmented and dispersed nature of legitimacy, the 'bottom-up' logic of state-building can prove dubious. Third, weak capacity in governance, and subcontracted sources of legitimacy, are likely to undermine the ability to develop independent structures and functions. Conclusions offer four case specific insights that can assist policy-makers in applying a more critical framework to the legitimacy of armed groups, before incorporating them into post-war governance arrangements. IntroductionExternally driven processes of state-building must decide between different types of nonstate actors as potential partners and justify the grounds for their selection. To find effective partners, state-builders must identify the source(s) of legitimacy of the different non-state groups. This article problematises the process of identifying legitimate political actors in contexts of institutional weakness and fragmented authority by focusing attention on the sources of legitimacy that are invoked by non-state actors as part of wartime governance arrangements. By addressing whether and how wartime governance practices and institutions developed under rebel governance administration may provide institutional raw material for state-building, it provides some key policy insights concerning the pitfalls of mainstreaming non-state roles without sufficient analysis of the sources of legitimacy of wartime governance frameworks. To demonstrate the linkages between different types of legitimacy invoked by non-state actors to sustain wartime governance arrangements, and their implications for post-conflict legitimacy, the article focuses on one type of non-state actor, i.e. rebel groups that have an intention to 'govern'. The article uses the case of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement's (SPLA/M) state-building efforts in South Sudan to examine two issues. First, how rebel groups interact with other types of non-state actors such as humanitarian aid agencies and local authorities or leaders in constructing their own legitimacy to rule; and second, the implications that fragmented sources of legitimacy might have for post-conflict stability. As a founding member of the G7 þ group of countries involved in implementing the New Deal on Engagement with Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, 1 South Sudan presents an important test case for exploring some of these policy relevant issues. Findings help explain how differences in the source of rebel group legitimacy can complicate their transition into stable political roles. Although the role of humanitarian actors and local traditional leadership are...

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In disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes, return to home communities is a normative given, around which reinsertion and reintegration support is planned. Yet such an approach is oblivious of pre-war social dynamics of rebel recruitment and civilian experiences of rebel abuse and coercion. These manifest as important sources of social tension between communities and combatants in the post-war period and complicate reintegration. This research shows that the 'recruitment-reintegration' nexus offers a key variable for explaining tensions between civilian communities and ex-combatants in postconflict Liberia, and could be leveraged in future efforts to improve DDR programmes.This article aims to further academic understanding of ex-combatant reintegration processes by demonstrating linkages between wartime patterns of rebel recruitment and civilian abuse to reintegration outcomes and angularities in post-conflict community -combatant relations in Liberia. The social history of war and patterns in wartime violence offer the social space of 'return'. In DDR practice, return to home communities is a normative given, around which reinsertion and reintegration support is planned. Yet such an approach is oblivious to conflict experiences relating to violence, recruitment, rebel abuse and coercion. These manifest as important sources of social tension between communities and combatants in the post-war period and complicate reintegration. The research on which this article is based indicates that the 'recruitment -reintegration' nexus offers a key explanatory variable for understanding tensions between civilian communities and ex-combatants in post-conflict Liberia and could be leveraged in future efforts to plan better DDR programmes.To demonstrate this argument, in the second section, a combination of excombatant recruitment and reintegration narratives and civilian accounts of rebel abuse is used to reconstruct the social history of violence in Lofa and Grand Gedeh (see Figure 1). These two counties were central to mobilization and manoeuvre by the Liberians for Reconciliation and Democracy in Liberia (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) during the second civil war (1999 -2003). Recruitment tactics of the LURD and MODEL were different. Coercion, looting and high incidence of civilian abuse with higher foreign mercenary presence was a prominent feature of the LURD. MODEL attracted more voluntary recruits in Grand Gedeh, while its leadership drew on experienced combatants from among Krahn-based armed groups active during the first civil war (1989 -96).

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