Undocumented Immigration and Host-Country Welfare: Competition Across Segmented Labor Markets*

Abstract

In this paper's model, undocumented workers are endogenously sorted into secondary labor markets. When further illegal immigration occurs, some new migrants follow their fellows into already migrant-dominated jobs, lowering migrant wages and raising real incomes of host-country labor and capital. Some submarkets switch from employing legal workers to employing migrants, lowering demand for and wages of legal workers. Undocumented immigration is Pareto-improving when enforcement reserves primary-sector jobs for legal workers. Pareto-dominant policies target the number of migrant-dominated submarkets, not the number of migrants. This appears consistent with U.S. enforcement practices. The effects of deportations, employer sanctions, and amnesties are explored.

Per capita income convergence and internal migration in Spain: Are foreign‐born migrants playing an important role?

“…Little attention, though, has been given to the internal migration patterns of established immigrants, despite the important implications that this topic could have on the geographic distribution of ethnic groups (Kritz and Nogle 1994), employment opportunities (Baker and Benjamin 1994; De New and Zimmermann 1994, Borjas et al. 1997; Card 1997; Westerlund 1997; Borjas 2003; Carter 2005; Borjas 2006), 2 social welfare provision (Jimeno and Dark 2007) and economic growth dynamics.…”

Irregular Migrants in Belgium and the Netherlands: Aspirations and Incorporation

“…But these are not the only reasons why investment migrants tend to do the type of work that natives or other migrants reject. They are also more likely to accept the prevailing low wages (see Carter 2005). These wages are below the official minimum and below what settlement and legalisation migrants usually demand, but they are higher than what investment migrants are used to in their countries of origin.…”

“…Although the presence of irregular migrants has been a common feature of Western economies for decades, the bulk of social research has traditionally been aimed at studying its causes and finding ways to solve the 'problem' (Portes 1978: 469). Recently, attention has also been directed to its consequences in terms of its effects on native employment and on wage levels (see, e.g., Ambrosini 2001;Amir 2000;Carter 2005;Chiswick 2000;Djajic 1997;Gosh 2000;Hazari & Sgro 2000;Martin 2010;Sarris & Zografakis 1999;Tapinos 2000;Venturini 1998;Yoshida & Woodland 2005). The first efforts to study the way irregular migrants live were made in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s (see, e.g., Chavez 1998;Cornelius 1982;Massey et al 1987;Portes & Bach 1985;Rodriguez 1987).…”

Policies on illegal immigration in a federation

“…The governments in countries A and B redistribute income by levying a flat rate income tax t A 10 There is some academic debate about the question of whether immigrants and natives tend to be substitutes in the labor market or whether they work on different labor markets (see Martin, 1988;Greenwood and McDowell, 1986;and Winegarden and Khor, 1991, for discussions). Recent theoretical models on illegal immigration tend to take the latter view (see, e.g., Carter, 1999Carter, , 2005Hillman and Weiss, 1999;or Djajic, 1997). There is some empirical evidence pointing in this direction as well (see, e.g., Greenwood and McDowell, 1986;Massey, 1987;Card, 1990;Winegarden and Khor, 1991;Friedberg and Hunt, 1995;Chiswick, 1988a,b).…”