2021
DOI: 10.3917/lcdm.034.0149
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Une idée incertaine de l’Europe. Comprendre les ambiguïtés stratégiques d’Emmanuel Macron

Abstract: Cet article dresse un bilan de l’action du président de la République quatre ans après son élection en 2017. Les initiatives prises par Emmanuel Macron sont caractérisées par certaines ambiguïtés stratégiques résultant d’un double programme d’action publique militaire. En héritier de la V e  République, le chef de l’État défend une « certaine idée » de la France, en soutenant un programme « souverainiste ». En entrepreneur de l’Europe, il investit une stratégie d’alliances intergouvernementale « et en même tem… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
4
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
5

Relationship

0
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
0
4
0
Order By: Relevance
“…A key manifestation of France under Macron seeking to organize EU politics according to French interests has been that Macron selectively favored either supranational or intergovernmental patterns: in fiscal policy, France proposed supranational methods like Commission borrowing. In defense policy, by contrast, not least in an attempt to protect France’s defense industry, Macron at times insisted on intergovernmental European decision-making procedures (Faure 2020c ).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A key manifestation of France under Macron seeking to organize EU politics according to French interests has been that Macron selectively favored either supranational or intergovernmental patterns: in fiscal policy, France proposed supranational methods like Commission borrowing. In defense policy, by contrast, not least in an attempt to protect France’s defense industry, Macron at times insisted on intergovernmental European decision-making procedures (Faure 2020c ).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In terms of discursive entrepreneurs, Macron found an important ally in Commission President Juncker (2018), pleading for ‘a Europe of defence’. Key French figures such Michel Barnier, Juncker's special advisor for defence and security between 2015 and 2016, or French Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Arnaud Danjean were also instrumental in pushing for this idea within the EU institutions (Béraud‐Sudreau and Pannier, 2021; Faure, 2021).…”
Section: Discursive Entrepreneurs – Power Through Ideasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This characterisation was hyperbolic to say the least as the EII is an intergovernmental and ad hoc forum situated outside of EU institutions (Major and Mölling 2017). As Samuel Faure rightly argues, much of Macron's defence policy doctrine including the nuclear deterrence doctrine, critical attitude of NATO and attempts to instate a ‘strategic dialogue’ with Russia reveals continuing attachment to ‘national’ rather than ‘European sovereignty’ (Faure 2020b, p. 151). The French government's allies are similarly sceptical about France's commitment to European defence policy integration.…”
Section: ‘European Sovereignty’ Across Four Policy Proposalsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The true significance of ‘European sovereignty’ instead lies in defence industrial policy , a domain where Macron pursed a radically different policy program based on ‘the weakening of the state's role to the benefit of supranational governance’ and ‘Europe through the market’ (Faure 2020b, p. 164). Given the competitive edge of its defence companies, France is uniquely positioned to capture market shares within an integrated EU defence market.…”
Section: ‘European Sovereignty’ Across Four Policy Proposalsmentioning
confidence: 99%