Unfinished Business: Efforts to Define Dual-Use Research of Bioterrorism Concern

Abstract

Biotechnological research poses a special security problem because of the duality between beneficial use and misuse. In order to find a balance between regulating potentially dangerous research and assuring scientific advancement, a number of assessments have tried to define which types of research are especially open to misuse and should therefore be considered dual-use research of special concern requiring rigorous oversight. So far, there has been no common understanding of what such activities are. Here we present a review of 27 assessments focusing on biological dual-use issues published between 1997 and 2008. Dual-use research activities identified by these assessments as being of special concern were compiled and compared. Moreover, from these 27 assessments, the primary research publications explicitly identified as examples of concerning research activities were extracted and analyzed. We extracted a core list of 11 activities of special concern and show that this list does not match with the reasons why primary research publications were identified as being of special concern. Additionally, we note that the 11 activities identified are not easily conducted or replicated, and therefore the likelihood of their being used in a high-tech mass casualty bioterrorism event should be reevaluated.

From Cases to Capacity? A Critical Reflection on the Role of ‘Ethical Dilemmas’ in the Development of Dual-Use Governance

“…The first is the existence of entrenched values, pressures and ignorance within the scientific community. So far there has only been a handful of experiments which are publicly known to have been identified as being of potential dual-use concern (Zmorzynska et al 2011: 375). Such a situation will continue to underpin skepticism of the ability of the scientific community to police itself.…”

Ethical Competence in Dual use Life Science Research

“…Biological agents of concern include, for example; smallpox, ricin, anthrax, and botulinum toxin (CDC, 2012). Similarly, although there appears to be a lack of agreement on what dual use research of concern constitutes, research activities with a high potential for misuse may include enhancing the virulence of a pathogen and demonstrating how to render a vaccine ineffective (NRC, 2004;Zmorzynska et al, 2011). Competence, in the authors' view, should go beyond being aware of and adhering to the above-mentioned lists of agents and research of concern.…”