Recent and emerging security policies and practices claim a mutual vulnerability that closely links human insecurity in failed states with the threat to powerful states from illicit flows. This article first examines this 'emerging orthodoxy' of transnational security issues that reinforces the securitisation of poverty and the poor. It then subjects this orthodoxy to theoretical and empirical critique. Theoretically it shows that this orthodoxy is formed as a 'geopolitical imagination' that associates and stabilises particular views of weak states and illicit flows in a 'netwar imagination' by reasserting and reconfiguring traditional assumptions of the spatiality and nature of threats. A final empirical section, focusing on drug production and nuclear smuggling, argues that those assumptions and their assemblage are a partial, incomplete and often self-referential reading of illicit flows.International security discourse and practice increasingly see 'weak' and 'failed' states as 'ungoverned' or 'dangerous' areas in which transnational security threats such as transnational criminal organisations and terrorists, and illicit flows of drugs, arms, people, nuclear materials and other harmful objects and actors converge and flourish. The first section of this article outlines the growth and breadth of this apparent consensus that combines the failed states discourse with the merger of security and development to produce particular understandings of the mutual vulnerability of north and south in which the transnational security problems of the north are seen as concentrated in 'ungoverned' areas of the south.The second section then uses the 'critical geopolitics' literature to argue that this asserted convergence is not a reflection of the globalisation of transnational threats but rather an evolving set of assumptions about the origin and nature of threats: a 'geopolitical imagination' that presents such places as nodes in a network for the organisation and transmission of illicit flows. Thus the failed states discourse and the merger of security and development, though widely criticised, are now integrated into a particular spatial imagination of security centring on the 'network'. However this represents a limited understanding of networks, in which traditional geopolitical assumptions are amended and re-stabilised rather than the full implications of network thinking being realised. In particular, by superimposing categories of network/non-state/criminal and hierarchy/state on to the map of 'ungoverned areas', more complex relations and geographies of the constitution and character of illicit flow networks are neglected.The final section seeks to highlight these more complex relations and geographies by assessing the relationship between these sites and networks and illicit flows of