Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly

Benchekroun, Hassan

doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00090-5

Cited by 70 publications

(93 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…This paper also contributes to the literature on unilateral adoption of environmental and resource regulations (e.g. Hoel (1991), Golombek and Hoel (2004) and Benchekroun (2002)). Our contribution is to determine the impact of unilateral regulations on R&D collaboration to abate pollution emissions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly

Benchekroun

Claude

2007

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly

Benchekroun

Claude

2007

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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“…In our paper, all countries are abaters in period 2 and the focus is on the intertemporal leakage only. A key difference with Eichner and Pethig (2011) 9 See Benchekroun (2003) in the context of international fisheries.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Açıkgöz

Benchekroun

2017

European Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Anticipated International Environmental Agreements AbstractConsider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types of IEAs that aim to reduce pollution stock in the environment. IEA type 1 sets a level of emissions, IEA type 2 and IEA type 3 set a percentage and a uniform cut vis-à-vis the business-as-usual policy respectively. IEA type 4 sets the policy that maximizes future joint benefits of the signatories. We show that all of these agreements reach their goal in the long run, but the intended benefits of these IEAs can potentially be offset by the anticipatory noncooperative response of the signatories, leading to an environmental degradation in the short run. Which IEA is preferable depends on the targeted level emissions during the phase of cooperation. When this target is above a certain threshold, welfare under IEA type 1 is larger than under IEA type 2 which is larger than under IEA type 3. Moreover, the highest level of welfare that can be attained under IEA type 1 is above the highest level of welfare achieved by any one of the other three IEAs.JEL-Codes: Q530, Q540, Q580, Q590.

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“…In the literature of resource economics, different factors are introduced to make the capacity as an endogenous variable. For instance, Benchekroun (2003) assumes an inversed-V shaped dynamics of resource accumulation, namely, the resource decreases if its stock is sufficiently large. We may consider the capacity dependent on some factors such as efforts.…”

Section: Change Of Renewable Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%