Union Certification Success under Voting versus Card-Check Procedures: Evidence from British Columbia, 1978–1998

Abstract

The author estimates the impact of compulsory election laws on certification success using data on over 6,500 private sector certifications from British Columbia over the years 1978-98. A unique quasi-experimental design is used by exploiting two changes in the union recognition law: first, in 1984, the introduction of mandatory elections; and second, in 1993, the repeal of elections and their replacement by the original card-check procedure. The author also estimates the effectiveness of management opposition tactics across union recognition regimes. Success rates declined by an average of 19 percentage points during the voting regime, and then increased by about the same amount when card-checks were re-instituted. The results indicate that the mandatory election law can account for virtually the entire decline. In addition, the findings suggest that management opposition was twice as effective under elections as under card-checks. Sne of the most important public policies affecting the union organizing process is the recognition procedure, that is, the mechanism by which the union attempts to demonstrate that it has sufficient support within the proposed bargaining unit to be certified. Up to the late 1980s, all Canadian provinces (except Nova Scotia after 1977) had "card-check" procedures, whereby the union could be certified without an election if it signed up a sufficient proportion of the proposed bargaining unit. The proportion required to avoid an election varied by province, but generally ranged between 50% and 55%. While it was possible for a certification bid to require a vote in a card-check province, few organizing drives actually went to an election. The Canadian system in those years contrasts starkly with the system in the United States and, until the 1999 Employment Relations Bill, with that in the United Kingdomalthough for very different reasons. As a result, the union recognition procedure

Union Status and Double-Breasting at Multinational Companies in Three Liberal Market Economies

“…while the Canadian legal framework is more favorable to unions than that of the United States (Godard 2003), the trend toward compulsory certification elections in a number of jurisdictions has increased the scope for employer opposition to representation (Bentham 2002;Riddell 2004;Campolieti et al 2007). Economic dominance pressures from the United States are evident to a degree throughout Canada, where some legal provisions have been tilted in the direction of the U.S. framework.…”

The Control of Managerial Discretion: Evidence from Unionization’s Impact on Employment Segregation

“…Figure 3 compares other observable characteristics: the union density of the MSA, the size of the bargaining unit, the proportion of cases in manufacturing establishments, and the proportion in right--to--work states. Studies have found all of these factors correlated with election outcomes (see Heneman and Sandver 1983;Riddell 2004;and Ferguson 2008 for reviews), as indeed the curves in figures 2 and 3 suggest. In each of these cases though crossing the 50--percent threshold is not associated with a striking change in the level of the variable concerned-unlike unionization itself, which is a step function at 50 percent support.…”

“…Unlike most work that uses union--representation election data (e.g., Heneman and Sandver 1983;Maranto and Fiorito 1987;Fiorito, Jarley, and Delaney 1995;Bronfenbrenner 1997;Riddell 2004;Ferguson 2008), I do not try to predict or model the success of particular campaigns. Quite the opposite: I focus on very close elections, those where success is least predictable.…”

Salaires et productivité du travail au Canada depuis le début du 20e siècle : les travailleurs bénéficient-ils de la croissance économique?

“…En Colombie-Britannique -province qui a vécu la mise en place du vote obligatoire au scrutin secret en 1984 et son remplacement en 1993 par la signature de cartes d'adhésion -, l'étude de Chris Riddell (2004) a montré que les tactiques d'opposition à la syndicalisation de la part des employeurs ont eu plus de succès lors du vote d'adhésion syndicale au scrutin secret. En effet, le taux de certification syndicale dans cette province a diminué de 19% avec le scrutin secret et augmenté dans les mêmes proportions avec la signature de cartes d'adhésion.…”