Union monétaire et fédéralisme

Abstract

[eng] Monetary Union and Federalism Pierre-Alain Muet The prospect of monetary union has renewed an interest in an old theme of the economic and political literature : federalism. What lessons can be drawn from existing federations for the building of Europe ? The first part of the paper surveys the main features of existing federations and the impact of federal budgets in stabilizing regional business cycles. The second part analyses the contribution of the economic theory of federalism as it reflects on European integration and the prospect of monetary Union. It examines the following points : the organisation of powers in EU ; the problem of coordinating fiscal and monetary policies ; and the allocation of public choices between different levels of government. The conclusion advocates for a strengthening of solidarity mechanisms within the Union, in particular on the budgetary side, which should parallel a higher democratization of Community institutions. [fre] La perspective de l'Union monétaire a suscité un renouveau d'intérêt pour un thème ancien de la littérature économique et politique : le fédéralisme. Quels enseignements peut-on tirer des expériences fédérales pour la construction européenne ? La première partie de l'article examine les mécanismes de redistribution et de stabilisation économique dans les principaux Etats fédéraux. La seconde analyse les apports de la théorie économique du fédéralisme à la réflexion sur la nature de la construction européenne, notamment dans la perspective de l'Union monétaire. On examine successivement: l'organisation des pouvoirs dans l'Union, l'articulation de la politique monétaire et des politiques budgétaires et l'allocation des choix publics entre les différents niveaux institutionnels. La conclusion plaide pour un renforcement des mécanismes de solidarité notamment budgétaires qui devrait accompagner une plus grande démocratisation des structures communautaires.

Will Fiscal Policy Be Effective Under Emu?

“…Second, the EU still appears closer to a confederation of independent states-with distinct cultures, languages, and political and legal traditions-than a federation, despite the extension of the majority vote to an increasing range of policy issues.lO Third, each member state remains accountable for its public finances, thus preventing the development of a large EU transfer budget justified by vertical imbalances-a feature that lOIn a confederation the role of the central entity is to coordinate policies between sovereign governments, whereas in afederation, it has the power to make centralized policy decisions over sub central governments. Although the EU judiciary system has the characteristics of a federal system, other EU institutions operate in ways similar to a confederation (Muet, 1995).…”

“…This effect could be offset, however, to the extent that the costs of higher debt will be borne in part by other EMU member states. In a centralized, EU-wide, system of transfers among member states facing opposite shocks, assuming that these shocks are equally likely to affect any country, stabilization policy could be more effective (Masson, 1996, Muet, 1995. Recent empirical work on Canada suggests that central stabilizers, which create no future tax liability, are at least twice as effective as provincial stabilizers (Bayoumi and Masson, 1998).…”

Fédéralisme fiscal dans un modèle de zone monétaire optimale

“…Comme le mentionne Muet [1995], l'accent a ete mis sur la necessite d'eviter les effets de redistribution que pouvaient generer ces transferts. Comme le mentionne Muet [1995], l'accent a ete mis sur la necessite d'eviter les effets de redistribution que pouvaient generer ces transferts.…”