2002
DOI: 10.1016/s0176-2680(01)00074-x
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Union structure and incentives for innovation

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
4

Citation Types

1
39
0

Year Published

2006
2006
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
9

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 37 publications
(40 citation statements)
references
References 12 publications
1
39
0
Order By: Relevance
“…However, the finding that the intensity of R&D collaborations should be positively correlated with union bargaining power is empirically troubling because the stylised facts surveyed earlier suggest the opposite -across industrialised countries, inter-firm R&D collaborations have become hugely more prevalent as labour markets have been deregulated and unions weakened. 4 Second, our paper contributes to the literature on unionisation and innovation. In contrast to our model, most existing studies of trade unions and R&D concentrate on how the presence of unions affects the R&D incentives of individual (isolated) firms.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…However, the finding that the intensity of R&D collaborations should be positively correlated with union bargaining power is empirically troubling because the stylised facts surveyed earlier suggest the opposite -across industrialised countries, inter-firm R&D collaborations have become hugely more prevalent as labour markets have been deregulated and unions weakened. 4 Second, our paper contributes to the literature on unionisation and innovation. In contrast to our model, most existing studies of trade unions and R&D concentrate on how the presence of unions affects the R&D incentives of individual (isolated) firms.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…However, if the industrywide labour union can charge different wages to different firms, the incentive for innovation is higher under firm-specific labour unions. In a model with R&D competition, Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) show that the incentive for a labour-saving innovation is higher under firm-specific labour unions for non-drastic innovations, while the incentive for innovation can be higher under an industry-wide labour union for drastic innovation. Manasakis and Petrakis (2009) show that, under non-cooperative R&D, the incentive for a labour-saving innovation is higher under firm-specific labour unions if knowledge spillover is high, but the incentive for innovation is always higher under firm-specific labour unions under cooperative R&D. They also show that welfare is higher under firm-specific unions than under an industry-wide labour union.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…4 Second, it contributes to the literature showing the effects of the unionization structure on innovation. While the earlier works 5 have shown the impact of union bargaining power on the incentives for innovation under decentralized unions, recently, Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) and Haucap and Wey (2004) show the (ambiguous) effects of different unionization structure on innovation in R&D competition and patent race models. The main intuition behind their results is related to the different types of constraints under different unionization structures, which affect the hold-up problems.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 97%