Unions and Efficient Training

Booth, Alison L.; Chatterji, Monojit

doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00290

Cited by 67 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…They argue that unions serve as a commitment device by overcoming the infeasibility of long-term wage contracts, since trainees are guaranteed at least the union wage in the future. Booth and Chatterji (1998) show that unions can bring the level of training closer to the social optimum by setting a sufficiently high training wage and therefore decrease turnover. Böheim and Booth (2004) and Green et al (1999) find empirical evidence that workers with union coverage received more training in Britain, whereas Booth et al (2003) find in addition that unionized workers received a higher return to training and a higher wage growth compared to workers without training.…”

Section: Relevant Literaturementioning

confidence: 98%

The financing of apprenticeship training in the light of labor market regulations

et al. 2010

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Section: Relevant Literaturementioning

confidence: 98%

The financing of apprenticeship training in the light of labor market regulations

et al. 2010

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“…Unions may ensure that 4 In another context, Booth and Chatterji (1998) show that union-firm wage bargaining can prevent ex-post monopsonistic wage-setting by firms and can thereby reduce inefficient quits. 6 covered workers receive higher wages and greater job security by directly intervening in training provision, for example by making sure that workers' skills are deepened and/or kept up-to-date through more training.…”

Section: Union Concern Over the Wage-employment Packagementioning

confidence: 99%

Unions, Work-Related Training, and Wages: Evidence for British Men

Booth¹,

Francesconi

Zoëga

2003

ILR Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by the Deutsche Post AG. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor, (2) internationalization of labor markets, (3) welfare state and labor market, (4) labor markets in transition countries, (5) the future of labor, (6) evaluation of labor market policies and projects and (7) general labor economics. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available on the IZA website (www.iza.org) or directly from the author. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 1996, the authors investigate the impact of union coverage on work-related training and how the union-training link affects wages and wage growth for a sample of full-time men. Relative to uncovered workers, union-covered men are more likely to receive training and also receive more days of training. In addition, union-covered men experience greater returns to training, and coveredtrained workers face a higher wage growth. While some of these findings have been found in previous studies, others are new. The wage results, in particular, suggest a rethinking is warranted of the conventional view that union wage formation in Britain reduces the incentives to acquire work-related training.JEL Classification: J24, J31, J41

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“…By contrast, it has been found that unionized plants are more likely to utilize incentive payments, also accompanied by joint decision-making, that lead to better results in terms of firm performance (Black and Lynch, 2001 (Bryson and Forth, 2010). This means that in unionized firms, constructive institutional responses overcome free rider problems of group incentives, increase workers' commitment and reduce voluntary labor turnover (Booth and Chatterji, 1998). …”

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confidence: 99%

Performance related pay, productivity and wages in Italy: a quantile regression approach

Damiani

Pompei

Ricci

2016

International Journal of Manpower

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The authors analyzed the role of Performance Related Pay (PRP) in a sample of Italian manufacturing and service firms and presented standard quantile estimates to investigate heterogeneity in pay-performance impacts on labor productivity and wages. In a second stage, the endogeneity of PRP was taken into account by using instrumental variable quantile regression techniques. They find considerable heterogeneity across the distribution of labor productivity and wages, with the highest role of PRP obtained at the lowest and highest quantiles. However, for all quantiles, the comparison of productivity and wage estimates suggests that PRP might not only be rent-sharing devices, but also incentive schemes that substantially lead to efficiency enhancements. These findings are confirmed for firms under union governance and suggest that well designed policies, that circumvent the limited implementation of PRP practices, would guarantee productivity improvement.JEL Classification: D24, J31; J33; J51.

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Unions and Efficient Training

Cited by 67 publications

References 18 publications

The financing of apprenticeship training in the light of labor market regulations

The financing of apprenticeship training in the light of labor market regulations

Unions, Work-Related Training, and Wages: Evidence for British Men

Performance related pay, productivity and wages in Italy: a quantile regression approach

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