Unity Versus Multiplicity: A Conceptual Analysis of the Term “Self” and Its Use in Personality Theories

Abstract

There is no single answer to the unity-multiplicity problem regarding the self for the simple reason that the term "self" is used by too many different theorists in too many different ways. In fact, there are several important substantive topic areas that need to be distinguished and studied scientifically. The topic areas I examine in this article are reflexivity, unit coherence, agency, and subjectivity. Each of these areas will be evaluated in terms of what it contributes to, and can be interpreted in terms of, the unity-multiplicity issue. It is proposed that we need a more differentiated technical vocabulary if we are to better understand the phenomena we are examining. Matching our technical vocabulary to this empirical detail sharpens the questions being asked and places the empirical facts in better focus. A more elaborate framework of conceptual differentiation provides a better basis for developing an integrated theory.

The unanticipated resilience of trait self-knowledge in the face of neural damage

“…Rather, recent research points to the self being constructed from a multiplicity of related, yet separable, processes, contents, and sources (both internal and external to the organism; for recent reviews, see Gillihan & Farah, 2005;Katzko, 2003;Klein, 2001Klein, , 2004Klein, , 2010Legrand & Ruby, 2009). As Klein, Rozendal, and Cosmides (2002d) have argued, instead of looking for a unitary entity we can describe as ''the self'', we should be breaking the problem into parts, studying aspects of the self separately before asking how they interact with one another to create the phenomenal appearance of unity.…”

“…Psychological studies, neuropsychological case histories, and philosophical analyses converge on the suggestion that the seemingly unitary self of everyday experience may be composed of several different, functionally isolable (though normally interacting) systems (for reviews, see Gallagher, 2000;Katzko, 2003;Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994: Klein, 2001Klein et al, 2008b;Legrand & Ruby, 2009;Lund, 2005;Ruby & Legrand, 2007). These include, but are not limited to: am the cause of ''my own'' (ownership) thoughts and actions (e.g., Frith, 1992;Gallagher, 2000;Hobson, 1993;Katzko, 2003;Klein & Nichols, 2010;Macmurray, 1957Macmurray, /1991.…”

“…These include, but are not limited to: am the cause of ''my own'' (ownership) thoughts and actions (e.g., Frith, 1992;Gallagher, 2000;Hobson, 1993;Katzko, 2003;Klein & Nichols, 2010;Macmurray, 1957Macmurray, /1991. 6.…”

Diplomacy and Self

“…10 Examining four connotations of this word-reflexivity, unit coherence, agency and subjectivity, Katzko concludes that "the term 'self' is a trap of ambiguity." 11 We find the following two dictionary definitions most useful. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines self as "a person's essential being that distinguishes them from others, especially considered as the object of introspection or reflective action."…”

The transculturing self II. Constructing identity through identification1

“…All this implies that any attempt to elaborate a consistent theory of the self should be prepared to overcome the traditional understanding of notions such as 'individual,' 'subject' and 'self' in order to contextualize them and to take under due consideration the connections between the self and the environment, as the debate concerning the so-called 'dialogical self' in contemporary psychology clearly shows (see, among others, Hermans, 2001;Martin, 2005; and from a cross-cultural perspective Adam & Markus, 2001;Roland, 2001). As for now, however, there seems to exist no easy way to elaborate such a theory mainly because the term 'self' has no clear meaning and cannot be unambiguously defined, as for example, Katzko (2003) has pointed out. This might even lead to the strong conclusion that 'there is no single answer to the unity-multiplicity debate for the simple reason that the term ''self'' is semantically ambiguous' (Katzko, 2003, p. 108), and that 'the term ''self'' has no place in psychological theory,' it being necessary instead to elaborate 'a more differentiated technical vocabulary if we are to better understand the phenomena we are examining' (p. 110).…”