2019
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-15655-8_6
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Univalent Foundations and the Equivalence Principle

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Cited by 12 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…In Theorem 3.6, we prove that they are in fact homotopy equivalent. The same correspondence for graphs also arises for many other structures [1,2], for example, groups, and topological spaces. Proof.…”
Section: The Category Of Graphsmentioning
confidence: 62%
“…In Theorem 3.6, we prove that they are in fact homotopy equivalent. The same correspondence for graphs also arises for many other structures [1,2], for example, groups, and topological spaces. Proof.…”
Section: The Category Of Graphsmentioning
confidence: 62%
“…axiomatic Set theory that comes with its internal identity relation provides a rigorous sense in which isomorphic structures can be said to be identical. We shall shortly see how this problem drives the category-theoretic approach in FOM and how it is settled in the Univalent FOM [1]. In Bourbaki's Elements the notion of self-standing mathematical structure independent of any set-theoretic background remains a wishful thinking or, on a more charitable interpretation, a regulative idea in the Kantian sense of the word.…”
Section: Foundations At Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…26 Only since the advance of the HoTT (circa 2014) we are finally in a position to discuss the alternative approaches to identity motivated by the general CT and the 20th century mathematical practice more formally. 27 B. Ahrens and P. R. North explore the issue of identity and sameness in [1] in the context of HoTT: 28 "What should it mean for two objects…”
Section: Assessing Identity and Extensionalitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Once one has reasons to employ second-order languages, i.e., languages that allow for quantification of predicate variables, to formalize a (philosophical or scientific) theory, Nominalists' attitude to formal ontology is primarily concerned with providing semantic strategies to avoid the ontologically committing reference to second-order entities, e.g., universals, "naively" intended to be the reference of quantified second-order variables. They deploy a peculiar substitutional semantics, one restricted to second-order quantification, 1 against the Realist approach that appeals to the so-called "full" or "referential" semantics of second-order languages [9]. 2 This semantics interprets quantified second-order formulas of the form "∃ X (Xa)", 3 over classes of first-order open formulas ϕ added to the original first-order model that are as "substituends" of the second-order quantificational apparatus.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%