Use of Game-Theoretical Methods in Biochemistry and Biophysics

Schuster, Stefan; Kreft, Jan‐Ulrich; Schroeter, Anja; Pfeiffer, Thomas

doi:10.1007/s10867-008-9101-4

Cited by 71 publications

(82 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…In fact, there have been at least two recent predictions that game theory could be useful in the interpretation of biochemical behavior (37,38), and the Azoarcus system in particular was singled out as a good candidate (37). Game theory has been proposed to be manifest at the chemical level (39)(40)(41), but this has never been shown empirically. We thus sought a practical demonstration that this could be the case, reasoning that game theory could augment our ODE analysis by offering a simple fitness-based explanation of how selection could choose, say, molecular cooperation.…”

Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics of prebiotic RNA reproduction illuminated by chemical game theory

Yeates

Hilbe

Zwick

et al. 2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Many origins-of-life scenarios depict a situation in which there are common and potentially scarce resources needed by molecules that compete for survival and reproduction. The dynamics of RNA assembly in a complex mixture of sequences is a frequencydependent process and mimics such scenarios. By synthesizing Azoarcus ribozyme genotypes that differ in their single-nucleotide interactions with other genotypes, we can create molecules that interact among each other to reproduce. Pairwise interplays between RNAs involve both cooperation and selfishness, quantifiable in a 2 × 2 payoff matrix. We show that a simple model of differential equations based on chemical kinetics accurately predicts the outcomes of these molecular competitions using simple rate inputs into these matrices. In some cases, we find that mixtures of different RNAs reproduce much better than each RNA type alone, reflecting a molecular form of reciprocal cooperation. We also demonstrate that three RNA genotypes can stably coexist in a rock-paper-scissors analog. Our experiments suggest a new type of evolutionary game dynamics, called prelife game dynamics or chemical game dynamics. These operate without templatedirected replication, illustrating how small networks of RNAs could have developed and evolved in an RNA world.RNA | prebiotic chemistry | origins of life | game theory | ribozyme A plausible description of a sequence of events that could have led to the origins of life on the Earth from a purely chemical milieu has long been desirable, yet remains elusive. The RNA world hypothesis has helped sharpen our focus on what could have taken place 4 Gya, in that RNA serves as a powerful model for a self-sustaining chemical system capable of evolutionary change (1-6). Although this hypothesis has engendered much debate, both in its general applicability and in the details of its implementation (7-9), there are some clear emerging trends. Among the recent advances in prebiotic RNA studies is the concept of an evolving "network" of RNAs being required to kick-start life, rather than a single selfish entity. This idea dates back to the formative studies of Eigen and Schuster in the 1970s (10, 11). However, it can be sharply seen in the 20+-y effort aimed at developing a generalized RNA replicase ribozyme in the laboratory: new successes have taken advantage of a fragmentation of the best such artificial ribozyme and invoke a network of reactions to provide for its assembly (12). Our own laboratories have focused on a variety of "prelife" (13, 14) and cooperative network (15, 16) approaches to understand how evolving RNA systems could have arisen from abiotic sources of nucleotides and short oligomers. Many others have also stressed the need for distributed functionality at the onset of life, both chemically (17) and in space and time (18,19).To advance a network approach to the "single biomolecule problem" in the RNA world, what is needed now is an understanding of how prebiotic networks could have evolved. Auspiciously, the mechanisms of network evol...

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Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics of prebiotic RNA reproduction illuminated by chemical game theory

Yeates

Hilbe

Zwick

et al. 2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…Classic examples reviewed in [25] include kin selection [26], direct and indirect reciprocity [27,28], network reciprocity [29], as well as group selection [30]. Recently, however, interdisciplinary research linking together knowledge from biology and sociology as well as mathematics and physics has revealed many refinements to these mechanisms and also new means by which the * szolnoki.attila@ttk.mta.hu † matjaz.perc@uni-mb.si successful evolution of cooperation among selfish and unrelated individuals can be understood [31][32][33][34][35][36][37].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Different perceptions of social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured populations

2014

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Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker's payoff, thus playing either the traditional prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population adopting a different payoff matrix the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mechanism responsible for this outcome is unique to structured populations, and it is due to the payoff heterogeneity, which spontaneously introduces strong cooperative leaders that give rise to an asymmetric strategy imitation flow in favor of cooperation. We demonstrate that the reported evolutionary outcomes are robust against variations of the interaction network, and they also remain valid if players are allowed to vary which game they play over time. These results corroborate existing evidence in favor of heterogeneity-enhanced network reciprocity, and they reveal how different perceptions of social dilemmas may contribute to their resolution.

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“…These are kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. Recent reviews [8][9][10][11] clearly attest to the fact that physics-inspired research has helped refine many of these concepts. In particular, evolutionary games in networks, spurred on by the seminal discovery of spatial reciprocity [12] and, subsequently, * szolnoki.attila@ttk.mta.hu by the discovery that scale-free networks strongly facilitate the evolution of cooperation [13,14], are still receiving ample attention to this day [15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas

et al. 2013

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We show that the resolution of social dilemmas in random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better-performing players but, rather, their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy to be the two emotions that determine the strategy of each player in any given interaction, and we define them as the probabilities of cooperating with players having a lower and a higher payoff, respectively. Starting with a population where all possible combinations of the two emotions are available, the evolutionary process leads to a spontaneous fixation to a single emotional profile that is eventually adopted by all players. However, this emotional profile depends not only on the payoffs but also on the heterogeneity of the interaction network. Homogeneous networks, such as lattices and regular random graphs, lead to fixations that are characterized by high sympathy and high envy, while heterogeneous networks lead to low or modest sympathy but also low envy. Our results thus suggest that public emotions and the propensity to cooperate at large depend, and are in fact determined by, the properties of the interaction network.

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Use of Game-Theoretical Methods in Biochemistry and Biophysics

Cited by 71 publications

References 66 publications

Dynamics of prebiotic RNA reproduction illuminated by chemical game theory

Dynamics of prebiotic RNA reproduction illuminated by chemical game theory

Different perceptions of social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured populations

Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas

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