We examined how perceived causal expertise affects the processing of causal persuasive arguments. In Study 1, participants received strong or weak causal arguments from a content-area expert who was high or low in causal expertise. Participants in the high causal expertise condition processed the causal arguments carefully: they were more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. In Study 2, participants received a high or low causal confidence prime and then read a message from a source who was high or low in content-area expertise. The message contained strong or weak, causal or non-causal arguments. Participants who received both the causal confidence prime and the high content-area expertise information processed the causal arguments carefully: they were more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. These findings demonstrate that causal and content-area expertise can increase motivation to attend to causal arguments. Implications for the persuasion literature are discussed.The findings of recent research suggest that when trying to change people's attitudes and beliefs, it is sometimes more important to explain why particular outcomes would occur than it is to provide evidence that suggests the outcomes would, in fact, occur (Slusher & Anderson, 1996;Tobin & Weary, 2008). Arguments that explain the causal mechanism responsible for some effect are called causal arguments. For instance, a causal argument against the legalization of casino gambling might claim that casinos attract those who can least afford it and then explain why (i.e., "because gambling offers low-income people a chance at riches and a solution to financial hardship," Tobin & Weary, 2008). A non-causal argument would Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Stephanie Tobin, Department of Psychology, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77204-5022. E-mail: stobin@uh.edu.
106toBin And rAymUndo make the same claim, but then support it with covariation or statistical information (i.e., "at most of the country's casinos, low-income people make up about 78% of the crowd at the slot machines"). Slusher and Anderson (1996) argued that causal arguments should be more effective than non-causal arguments at changing people's social theories, or beliefs about how and why variables are related. They posited that the persistence of social theories depends upon the relative number of available causal explanations in support of a given theory compared to those opposing it. Causal arguments provide individuals with new explanations that help to shift the balance of explanations in favor of the desired conclusion. Consistent with this idea, Slusher and Anderson found that causal arguments were more effective than non-causal arguments in educating people about the transmission of AIDS, due to their effect on explanation availability. In addition, they found that causal arguments were not as subject to biased evaluation. That is, opposing initial beliefs led participants to discount non-causal evidence, but not caus...