Using Multiwinner Voting to Search for Movies

Gawron, Grzegorz; Faliszewski, Piotr

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_8

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Thus, even though a voter may benefit by abstaining, she may not be able to recognize it. Moreover, our technique for showing these hardness results is very universal and allows us to recover, strengthen, or complement existing hardness results by Faliszewski, Gawron, and Kusek (2022) and Janeczko and Faliszewski (2023). In addition, our results indicate that many basic problems (e.g., whether there is a winning committee for which a given voter approves ℓ candidates) are NP-hard for sequential rules.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

“…Finally, our reductions give novel insights into the robustness of sequential ABC voting rules. Faliszewski, Gawron, and Kusek (2022) consider the question whether the outcome of an election can change if a given number of approvals of candidates can be added or removed. They find that this problem is NP-hard for seqCCAV, seqPAV, and seqPhragmén.…”

Section: Hardness Of Abstentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our paper is also related to the study of strategyproofness and robustness in ABC voting (e.g., Aziz et al 2015;Peters 2018;Bredereck et al 2021;Faliszewski, Gawron, and Kusek 2022). In particular, participation can be seen as a variant of strategyproofness that prohibits that voters manipulate by abstaining, or as a robustness axiom that measures how much impact an abstaining voter can have on the outcome.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Maybe the most apparent example for this are elections of parliaments or city councils, but there are also numerous applications beyond classical voting. For instance, this model can also be used to describe automated recommender systems (Gawron and Faliszewski 2022) or the selection of validators in a block chain (Cevallos and Stewart 2021). In the field of computational social choice, such elections are known as approval-based committee (ABC) elections and they have recently attracted significant attention (Faliszewski et al 2017;Lackner and Skowron 2023).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections

Bullinger,

Dong,

Lederer

et al. 2024

AAAI

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In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters’ approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent years, the incentives for voters to participate in an election for a given ABC voting rule have been neglected so far. This paper is thus the first to explicitly study this property, typically called participation, for ABC voting rules. In particular, we show that all ABC scoring rules even satisfy group participation, whereas most sequential rules severely fail participation. We furthermore explore several escape routes to the impossibility for sequential ABC voting rules: we prove for many sequential rules that (i) they satisfy participation on laminar profiles, (ii) voters who approve none of the elected candidates cannot benefit by abstaining, and (iii) it is NP-hard for a voter to decide whether she benefits from abstaining

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

Section: Hardness Of Abstentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections

Bullinger,

Dong,

Lederer

et al. 2024

AAAI

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This problem has traditionally been studied by economists for settings where a single candidate is elected (Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura 2002), but there is also a multitude of applications where a fixed number of the candidates needs to be elected. The archetypal example for this is the election of a city council, but there are also technical applications such as recommender systems (Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang 2016;Gawron and Faliszewski 2022). In social choice theory, this type of elections is typically called approval-based committee (ABC) elections and has recently attracted significant attention (e.g., Aziz et al 2017;Faliszewski et al 2017;Lackner and Skowron 2023).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Refined Characterizations of Approval-Based Committee Scoring Rules

Dong,

Lederer

2024

AAAI

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In approval-based committee (ABC) elections, the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. One of the most popular classes of ABC voting rules are ABC scoring rules, for which voters give points to each committee and the committees with maximal total points are chosen. While the set of ABC scoring rules has recently been characterized in a model where the output is a ranking of all committees, no full characterization of these rules exists in the standard model where a set of winning committees is returned. We address this issue by characterizing two important subclasses of ABC scoring rules in the standard ABC election model, thereby both extending the result for ABC ranking rules to the standard setting and refining it to subclasses. In more detail, by relying on a consistency axiom for variable electorates, we characterize (i) the prominent class of Thiele rules and (ii) a new class of ABC voting rules called ballot size weighted approval voting. Based on these theorems, we also infer characterizations of three well-known ABC voting rules, namely multi-winner approval voting, proportional approval voting, and satisfaction approval voting.

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Preference Aggregation Mechanisms for a Tourism-Oriented Bayesian Recommender

Streviniotis

Chalkiadakis

2022

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Using Multiwinner Voting to Search for Movies

Cited by 8 publications

References 30 publications

Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections

Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections

Refined Characterizations of Approval-Based Committee Scoring Rules

Preference Aggregation Mechanisms for a Tourism-Oriented Bayesian Recommender

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