Using Non‐Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance

Abstract

This article explores means by which non-governmental institutions andresources, both commercial and volunta y, may be enlisted in the interest of regulatory compliance. Following a discussion of non-governmental social control, it reviews the basic institutional forms of indirect governance through which third-party "co-production" of compliance might occur. It then discusses the basic issues which arise when certain public functions are delegated to or devolve upon private interests, and suggests safeguards which might be put in place to enhance the advantages and to minimize the adverse consequences of such devolution. The conclusion seeks to articulate basic principles for the mobilization of third parties in furtherance of compliance, and to encourage the idea of a more participative regulatoy process.

Regulatory capitalism and the reassertion of the public interest

“…The notion of metaregulation is closely related to the notion of enforced self-regulation as formulated above; however, unlike enforced self-regulation, it allows the regulatee to determine its own rules. The regulatory role of the state is confined to the institutionalization and monitoring of the integrity of the work of the compliance group of the regulatees (Grabosky, 1995;Morgan, 2003, p. 2;Parker, 2002). Finally, a form of regulatory corporatism emerges from ''multi-level regulation''.…”

“…While the two notions retain a close affinity, civil regulation, unlike voluntary regulation, may, at least in principle, possess coercive aspects. Civil regulation includes old and traditional forms of self-regulation but goes beyond it to include third-party regulation where various gatekeepers act as regulators (rule setters, rule monitors and rule enforces) of public standards (Grabosky, 1995;Kraakman, 1986).…”

Les morphologies de la sécurité après le 11 septembre : hiérarchies, marché et réseaux

“…Dans la mesure où la complexité des réseaux de sécurité décrits ici s'oppose à une intégration hiérarchique des mécanismes d'imputabilité, le recours à des mécanismes de métarégulation, c'est-à-dire de régulation de la régulation, semble être une option plus réaliste. Cette approche commence juste à faire l'objet de recherches dans d'autres domaines de la gouvernance (Grabosky, 1995 ;Parker, 2002 ;Braithwaite, 2003). Elle ouvre cependant des perspectives intéressantes de conceptualisation de l'imputabilité dans le contexte des réseaux de sécurité, qui ne pourront être tenus à la reddition de comptes que par des réseaux d'imputabilité.…”

RSPCA and the criminology of social control

“…I n turn, the RSPCA continues to offer both expert advice and guarded criticism on current deficiencies in the legislative arsenal of the state, such as the Dangerous Dogs Act of 1991 (amended 1997) and proposals for amendment of this piece of legislation which is widely regarded as being 5 Note, however, the brief but undeveloped analysis in Grabosky [20] and Scott, [41]. populist, ill-thought through and largely symbolic.…”