Using utility information to calibrate customer demand management behavior models

Fahrioğlu, Murat; Alvarado, F.L.

doi:10.1109/59.918305

Cited by 182 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…from the model and regarded as inputs to the IL relief model run by the LSEs. The outage cost function is assumed to be quadratic following [10] and [13], and incentive compensations are adopted as extra motivations to encourage customers to participate in IL programs and consequently choose the proper contract.…”

Section: Demand Reliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Simultaneous Provision of Flexible Ramping Product and Demand Relief by Interruptible Loads Considering Economic Incentives

Wen

et al. 2017

Energies

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Abstract:To cope with the net load variability in real time, sufficient ramp capability from controllable resources is required. To address the issue of insufficient ramp capacity in real time operations, flexible ramping products (FRPs) have been adopted by some Independent System Operators (ISOs) in the USA as a new market design. The inherent variability and uncertainty caused by renewable energy sources (RESs) call for new FRP providers apart from conventional generating units. The so-called interruptible load (IL) has proved to be useful in maintaining the supply-demand balance by providing demand relief and can be a viable FRP provider in practice. Given this background, this work presents a stochastic real-time unit commitment model considering ramp requirement and simultaneous provision of IL for FRP and demand relief. Load serving entities (LSEs) are included in the proposed model and act as mediators between the ISO and multiple ILs. In particular, incentive compatible contracts are designed to encourage customers to reveal their true outage costs. Case studies indicate both the system and LSEs can benefit by employing the proposed method and ILs can gain the highest profits by signing up a favorable contract.

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Section: Demand Reliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similar rationale applies for RES output curtailment as shown in constraint (12), in which P w,t,s is the RES output without curtailment. In terms of IL, Constraint (13) imposes that a LES's total provision of demand relief and FRP should not exceed its overall capacity.…”

Section: Stochastic Rtuc Considering System Ramping Requirement and Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Simultaneous Provision of Flexible Ramping Product and Demand Relief by Interruptible Loads Considering Economic Incentives

Wen

et al. 2017

Energies

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“…The authors also explore the performance of ILCs under retailer competition. Fahrioglu and Alvarado [21,22] study incentive-compatible ILCs and describe a methodology for the electricity utility to estimate the customer demand and the value of interruptibility for the customer through utility data. The authors' objective is to design the contract incentives in a way that enables the revelation of the customers' actual valuation of the interruption.…”

Section: Interruptible Load Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Models for Production Planning under Power Interruptions

2011

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“…A model of consumer behavior in response to incentives is designed in a mechanism design framework in (Zhou et al, 2017), where aggregator collects the price elasticities of the demand as bids and then it selects the most susceptible users to incentives such that an aggregate reduction is obtained. In (Fahrioglu and Alvarado, 2001), truthful contracts are designed for DR, which maximize the power utility company benefit function subject to individual rationality and incentive-compatible constraints. A VCG mechanism applied in DR is presented in (Samadi et al, 2012), where the authors ver-ify some properties such as efficiency, user truthfulness, and nonnegative transfer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Limiting gaming opportunities on incentive-based demand response programs

2018

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Demand Response (DR) is a program designed to match supply and demand by modifying consumption profile. Some of these programs are based on economic incentives, in which, a user is paid to reduce his energy requirements according to an estimated baseline. Literature review and practice have shown that the counter-factual models of employing baselines are vulnerable for gaming. Classical solutions of mechanism design require that agents communicate their full types which result in greater difficulties for its practical implementation. In this paper, a novel contract is developed to induce individual rationality (voluntary participation) and asymptotic incentive-compatibility (truthfulness) through probability of call, where an agent does not require to report the marginal utility. In this approach, a consumer only announces the baseline and reduction capacity, given a payment scheme that includes cost of electricity, incentive price, and penalty caused by any deviation between self-reported and actual energy consumption. The aggregator decides randomly what users are called to perform the energy reduction. As result, asymptotic truth-telling behavior in incentive-based DR is managed by the aggregator through the probability of call for each agent. Mathematical proofs and numerical studies are provided to demonstrate the properties and advantages of this contract in limiting gaming opportunities and in terms of its implementation.

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Using utility information to calibrate customer demand management behavior models

Cited by 182 publications

References 6 publications

Simultaneous Provision of Flexible Ramping Product and Demand Relief by Interruptible Loads Considering Economic Incentives

Simultaneous Provision of Flexible Ramping Product and Demand Relief by Interruptible Loads Considering Economic Incentives

Models for Production Planning under Power Interruptions

Limiting gaming opportunities on incentive-based demand response programs

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