Vacancies, vetting, and votes: A unified dynamic model of the appointments process

Abstract

Pundits, politicians, and political scientists alike often bemoan the long delays in filling both executive and judicial vacancies. However, most political science scholarship has ignored why executives delay nomination, instead focusing on why legislatures delay confirmation. In this article, I develop a formal model that seeks to explain the causes and consequences of both types of delay. By incorporating the effects of time, nominee competence, and nonpolicy incentives, the model provides a number of important findings: (1) the passage of time exacerbates the executive’s first-mover advantage and may result in less-competent nominees; (2) confirmation delay results when the executive’s costs of searching for new nominees are sufficiently high and/or the pool of potential candidates for nomination is sufficiently incompetent; and (3) nomination delay results when the executive’s internal vetting process indicates a candidate for nomination is sufficiently incompetent relative to the pool of potential nominees.

The When and Why of Nominations

“…Here, partisan and ideological dynamics will both point in the same direction, either jointly shortening or elongating the confirmation process. In these instances, due to its "team" aspect (e.g., Lee, 2008), partisanship should only exacerbate the effects of ideology (consistent with the logic in Hollibaugh, 2015c). With divided government, time until confirmation should increase due to the increased need for internal vetting to ensure confirmability relative to what is required under unified government.…”

“…For example, when the President and the Senate are at ideological or partisan odds, both executive and judicial nominees tend to endure longer confirmation periods and are more likely to be rejected (Asmussen, 2011;Bailey, 2007;Bell, 2002;Hartley & Holmes, 2002;Hollibaugh, 2015c;Jo, Forthcoming;McCarty & Razaghian, 1999;Shipan & Shannon, 2003). 1 Additionally, both the executive and judicial literatures have found that competent nominees experience greater confirmation probabilities and shorter delays (Basinger & Mak, 2010;Cameron, Cover, & Segal, 1990;Epstein, Lindstädt, Segal, & Westerland, 2006;Hollibaugh, 2015bHollibaugh, , 2015cShipan & Shannon, 2003; but see Lott, 2005, for a contrary claim). The importance of executive positions is also relevant, as nominees to the most important offices tend to be confirmed more quickly (Aberbach & Rockman, 2009;Chiou & Rothenberg, 2014;Krutz, Fleisher, & Bond, 1998;McCarty & Razaghian, 1999).…”

What price the court of St. James? Political influences on ambassadorial postings of the United States of America

“…1 The literature also considers the qualifications of executive agency appointments in detail. See Cohen, (1998), Edwards (2001), Heclo (1977), Hollibaugh (2013Hollibaugh ( , 2015c, Hollibaugh et al (2014), Krause and O'Connell (2010), Jo and Rothenberg (2012), and Lewis (2008aLewis ( , 2008b. 2 A number of alternative formal strategic models also consider executive appointments and delegation in the context of agenda-setting models.…”

“… The literature also considers the qualifications of executive agency appointments in detail. See Cohen, (), Edwards (), Heclo (), Hollibaugh (2013, ), Hollibaugh et al (), Krause and O'Connell (), Jo and Rothenberg (), and Lewis (, ).…”

Presidential Appointments and Public Trust

“…How, then, might political nominees and appointees themselves affect public trust? Recent work on the politics of presidential appointments has focused on three broad criteria on which presidents decide who will serve in their administrations—responsiveness, competence, and patronage benefits (e.g., Bearfield ; Gallo and Lewis ; Heclo ; Hollibaugh ; Hollibaugh ; Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis ; Lewis ; Lewis ; Lewis ; Moe ; Parsneau ). Responsiveness, alternatively characterized as loyalty or ideological fidelity, captures the extent to which appointees are politically, philosophically, ideologically, or personally in sync with the president's needs and goals.…”