What price the court of St. James? Political influences on ambassadorial postings of the United States of America

Abstract

This paper explores the appointment of career diplomats and political appointees to ambassadorial positions. We present models of the strategic interaction of political donors and presidential candidates, which predicts that donations will match the quality of diplomatic posting granted by the candidate. We test this prediction and confirm it for four presidential terms representing two presidents and 764 diplomatic postings over the 2000 to 2013 period. This allows for the generation of a price list associated with a range of desirable diplomatic posts. This paper provides evidence in support of the proposition that ambassadorships, in locations that are deemed desirable such as Western Europe, are awarded as a form of patronage in return for campaign contributions.

Madame President, Madame Ambassador? Women Presidents and Gender Parity in Latin America’s Diplomatic Services

“…Distinguishing between the type of appointment is important because not all ambassadors have risen through the bureaucratic ranks of the career service. Political appointments, for example, are well studied in the case of the United States, where they amount for (at least) 25 percent of all ambassadorial appointments (Fedderke and Jett 2017, 385; Haglund 2015, 659; Hollibaugh 2015, 48). Politically sensitive missions may benefit from an ambassador’s closer ties with the chief executive.…”

“…4 Unlike prime ministers, presidents tend to have considerable discretion in the appointment of ambassadors. While constitutional prerogatives empower incumbents, as selectors, they also face constraints because political allies may expect ambassadorships in exchange for their support (Fedderke and Jett 2017; Hollibaugh 2015). Furthermore, in many countries, the career service conditions the “supply” of eligible personnel, often to the detriment of women.…”

Striped Pants versus Fat Cats: Ambassadorial Performance of Career Diplomats and Political Appointees

“…Recent work has begun to add theoretical and empirical examination of ambassadorial selection. An initial study buttresses the conventional wisdom by showing that political appointees typically receive postings in high‐income, high‐tourism western European capitals such as London (Fedderke and Jett ). Hollibaugh () develops and then empirically tests a formal theory to explain presidential selection of ambassadors by incorporating expectations of policy and patronage benefit along with a penalty in policy for less competent appointees; the analyses and results go beyond Fedderke and Jett's () findings to highlight how both domestic and foreign political factors influence presidential choices.…”

The Political Determinants of Ambassadorial Appointments

“…While there exists little research on the determinants of nonprofessional ambassadors per se (but see Fedderke and Jett 2015; also see Flynn 2014 for a discussion of the importance of domestic factors with respect to appointments to the foreign policy bureaucracy more generally), there exists a rather large body of research on the qualifications and backgrounds of executive agency appointees (e.g., Cohen 1998;Edwards 2001;Heclo 1977;Hollibaugh 2015aHollibaugh , 2015bHollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014;Krause and O'Connell 2015;Lewis 2008Lewis , 2009). Previous research on agency appointments has with-ambassador-posts.html (accessed April 18, 2015); Jonathan Weisman and Yuka Hayashi, "Donors Find a Home in Obama's Ambassador Corps," Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB124658149328689699.html (accessed April 18, 2015).…”

“…7. Presidents have long nominated major financial or political allies to diplomatic posts and other important positions (e.g., Fedderke and Jett 2015;Fish 1902;Kaufman 1956;van Riper 1958;Wilson 1887). Domestically, the Pendleton Act of 1883 was an attempt to curb the spoils-based excesses of the personnel system via the creation of the Civil Service Commission, though the results fell far short of reformers' goals (Bearfield 2009;Burge and Lewis 2010;Lewis 2008Lewis , 2009Mackenzie 1981).…”