Vaccinating behaviour guided by imitation and aspiration

Arefin, Md. Rajib; Tanaka, Masaki; Tanimoto, Jun

doi:10.1098/rspa.2020.0327

Cited by 20 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…This was later generalized into the so-called ‘vaccination games’ framework (see [24] for a comprehensive review). Such approach led to many interesting observations and predictions in vaccination protocols [14] , [47] , [48] , [49] , [50] , [51] , [52] , [53] , [54] , [55] , [56] , [57] , [58] , [59] , [60] .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

Amaral

Oliveira

Javarone

2021

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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During pandemic events, strategies such as social distancing can be fundamental to reduce simultaneous infections and mitigate the disease spreading, which is very relevant to the risk of a healthcare system collapse. Although these strategies can be recommended, or even imposed, their actual implementation may depend on the population perception of the risks associated with a potential infection. The current COVID-19 crisis, for instance, is showing that some individuals are much more prone than others to remain isolated. To better understand these dynamics, we propose an epidemiological SIR model that uses evolutionary game theory for combining in a single process social strategies, individual risk perception, and viral spreading. In particular, we consider a disease spreading through a population, whose agents can choose between self-isolation and a lifestyle careless of any epidemic risk. The strategy adoption is individual and depends on the perceived disease risk compared to the quarantine cost. The game payoff governs the strategy adoption, while the epidemic process governs the agent’s health state. At the same time, the infection rate depends on the agent’s strategy while the perceived disease risk depends on the fraction of infected agents. Our results show recurrent infection waves, which are usually seen in previous historic epidemic scenarios with voluntary quarantine. In particular, such waves re-occur as the population reduces disease awareness. Notably, the risk perception is found to be fundamental for controlling the magnitude of the infection peak, while the final infection size is mainly dictated by the infection rates. Low awareness leads to a single and strong infection peak, while a greater disease risk leads to shorter, although more frequent, peaks. The proposed model spontaneously captures relevant aspects of a pandemic event, highlighting the fundamental role of social strategies.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

Amaral

Oliveira

Javarone

2021

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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“…In this high-powered, pre-registered study (OSF: https://osf.io/wq47e ), we contribute to the growing literature that uses social dilemma games to model people’s behaviours in a pandemic situation [ 19 – 21 ] that includes, for example, individuals’ strategic decision to take up a vaccine [ 22 ], and policy makers’ decision of whether to continue shutting down the economy to curtail the spread of COVID-19 [ 23 ]. We do so by experimentally investigating the social perception of mask and non-mask wearers during the COVID-19 pandemic in America.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When face masks signal social identity: Explaining the deep face-mask divide during the COVID-19 pandemic

et al. 2021

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With the COVID-19 pandemic still raging and the vaccination program still rolling out, there continues to be an immediate need for public health officials to better understand the mechanisms behind the deep and perpetual divide over face masks in America. Using a random sample of Americans (N = 615), following a pre-registered experimental design and analysis plan, we first demonstrated that mask wearers were not innately more cooperative as individuals than non-mask wearers in the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game when information about their own and the other person’s mask usage was not salient. However, we found strong evidence of in-group favouritism among both mask and non-mask wearers when information about the other partner’s mask usage was known. Non-mask wearers were 23 percentage points less likely to cooperate than mask wearers when facing a mask-wearing partner, and 26 percentage points more likely to cooperate than mask wearers when facing a non-mask-wearing partner. Our analysis suggests social identity effects as the primary reason behind people’s decision whether to wear face masks during the pandemic.

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“…the hysteresis effect [ 16 ]. Among others, an important approach is combining evolutionary game theory with epidemiological models [ 7 , 17 , 18 ]. Evolutionary game theory provides a general mathematical framework for modelling behavioural changes in a population driven by both social influence and self-interest.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oscillatory dynamics in the dilemma of social distancing

Glaubitz

2020

Proc. R. Soc. A.

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Social distancing as one of the main non-pharmaceutical interventions can help slow down the spread of diseases, like in the COVID-19 pandemic. Effective social distancing, unless enforced as drastic lockdowns and mandatory cordon sanitaire, requires consistent strict collective adherence. However, it remains unknown what the determinants for the resultant compliance of social distancing and their impact on disease mitigation are. Here, we incorporate into the epidemiological process with an evolutionary game theory model that governs the evolution of social distancing behaviour. In our model, we assume an individual acts in their best interest and their decisions are driven by adaptive social learning of the real-time risk of infection in comparison with the cost of social distancing. We find interesting oscillatory dynamics of social distancing accompanied with waves of infection. Moreover, the oscillatory dynamics are dampened with a non-trivial dependence on model parameters governing decision-makings and gradually cease when the cumulative infections exceed the herd immunity. Compared to the scenario without social distancing, we quantify the degree to which social distancing mitigates the epidemic and its dependence on individuals’ responsiveness and rationality in their behaviour changes. Our work offers new insights into leveraging human behaviour in support of pandemic response.

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Vaccinating behaviour guided by imitation and aspiration

Cited by 20 publications

References 54 publications

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

When face masks signal social identity: Explaining the deep face-mask divide during the COVID-19 pandemic

Oscillatory dynamics in the dilemma of social distancing

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