Validity for Strong Pluralists

Cotnoir, Aaron J.

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00544.x

Cited by 26 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…But this consequence should not be taken as a major drawback for my solution, since (i) the strong pluralist is forced to include a deflationary truth predicate anyway (as I have shown in §2 & §3.2) and (ii) the resulting strong pluralism can avoid several major criticisms to full-fledged deflationism (as I have shown in §3.2, §5, and §6). Second, it suggests that the viability of strong 49 See Beall (2000); Pedersen (2006); Cotnoir (2013);Ferrari, Moruzzi, and Pederson (2020) for other proposals.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A quasi-deflationary solution to the problems of mixed inferences and mixed compounds

Zhang

2024

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Truth pluralism is the view that there is more than one truth property. The strong version of it (i.e. strong pluralism) further contends that no truth property is shared by all true propositions. In this paper, I help strong pluralism solve two pressing problems concerning mixed discourse: the problem of mixed inferences (PI) and the problem of mixed compounds (PC). According to PI, strong pluralism is incompatible with the truthpreservation notion of validity; according to PC, strong pluralists cannot find any appropriate truth property for mixed compound propositions, whose atomic constituents are from different domains of discourse (e.g., ). I argue that the strong pluralist is motivated to take the truth predicate in truth-involving universal statements to be deflationary to avoid the two pressing problems. Such a move entails that the truth predicate in the platitude of validity (V) for any argument, it is valid if and only if necessarily its conclusion is true when its premises are all true does not denote any substantive truth property. Instead, it is merely an expressive device to help people generalize instances of (V) to (V). Analogous stories hold for the truth predicate in the platitudes of compound (e.g., conjunction). The upshot is that, the strong pluralist can solve PI and PC by further conceding that mixed compounds are true/false in a deflationary way.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 See, for examples, Wright (1992, p.38), Lynch (2009, pp.76-8). 8 Wright (1992), Cotnoir (2013), Pedersen (2018), Ferrari, Moruzzi, andPedersen (2020) have defended (SP). 9 See Pedersen & Wright (2018) for a comprehensive introduction to the problems for strong pluralism.…”

Section: §1 Strong Truth Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A quasi-deflationary solution to the problems of mixed inferences and mixed compounds

Zhang

2024

Inquiry

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“…Gila Sher () argues that truth is always a matter of correspondence, but that the nature of correspondence varies from domain to domain (see also Barnard and Horgan ). Still other pluralists argue that there is no general truth property shared by all and only truths; instead, there is just the collection of alethic properties that make truth‐bearers true in different domains (e.g., Cotnoir ).…”

Section: Pluralism and Its Motivationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Putting Pluralism in its Place

Asay

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to pluralism that challenges its fundamental commitment to there being a set of alethic properties in virtue of which claims are true. In its place I offer an alternative view that merges standard truthmaker theory with a primitivist conception of truth. This combination of views satisfies the theoretical desires that pluralists claim for themselves, but without taking on pluralism's host of challenges and problems.

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“…The only reason for this is ease of exposition and not a commitment to a realist metaphysics. Indeed, the issue discussed here is largely independent of the metaphysics of properties (as shown in(Strollo, 2022a)), and it could be reformulated, for example, in a nominalist jargon speaking of objective similarities among individuals rather than properties.10 On the debate of mixed inferences see, e.g.,(Pedersen, 2006;Cotnoir, 2013;Edwards, 2013;Yu, 2017;Strollo, 2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…This is indeed consistent with most strong pluralist treatments. 14 Of course, also concepts have properties and count as real in the mental realm, but the idea should be clear.15 The idea of allowing (atomic) propositions to belong to different domains (as inCotnoir, 2013;Yu, 2017) is questionable from a truth pluralist point of view. However, for the sake of charity, we concede the point here…”

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confidence: 99%

Truth and the Unity of Logical Validity

Strollo

2024

LLP

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According to a traditional view, logical validity consists in necessary truth preservation. Such an account has been argued to carry an apparent commitment to a unique property of truth to be preserved from premises to conclusion. Recent discussions, however, have concluded that if the metaphor of truth preservation is carefully unpacked, no need for a unique property is there. All is needed is that certain structural relations among instantiations of truth properties hold. Against this view, we argue that a unique general truth property is indeed required by logical validity. We first show that the unpacking should be correctly understood since it imposes constraints on the concept and the properties of truth. We then demonstrate that, under such constraints, a general property is not imposed by truth preservation but by another feature of validity: its uniformity. Finally, some options that could be attempted to resist this result are discussed, showing that (strong) truth pluralism and deflationism are affected in different ways.

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Validity for Strong Pluralists

Cited by 26 publications

References 43 publications

A quasi-deflationary solution to the problems of mixed inferences and mixed compounds

A quasi-deflationary solution to the problems of mixed inferences and mixed compounds

Putting Pluralism in its Place

Truth and the Unity of Logical Validity

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