Philosophy and the Natural Environment 1994
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511524097.004
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Value in Nature and the Nature of Value

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Cited by 77 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…[11] A theory of autonomous intrinsic value must be distinguished as clearly as possible from an anthropogenic one in which values are conferred to natural entities along with the act of human acknowledgement. Rolston calls the latter "extrinsic" [12] because value is not truly intrinsic to natural entities but only projected upon them by humans. Seen through the prism of an objectivist meta-ethics, extraterrestrial space can be described as a new environment where multiple natural values subsist without any reference to human valorization/experimentation.…”
Section: Argument Of the Papermentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…[11] A theory of autonomous intrinsic value must be distinguished as clearly as possible from an anthropogenic one in which values are conferred to natural entities along with the act of human acknowledgement. Rolston calls the latter "extrinsic" [12] because value is not truly intrinsic to natural entities but only projected upon them by humans. Seen through the prism of an objectivist meta-ethics, extraterrestrial space can be described as a new environment where multiple natural values subsist without any reference to human valorization/experimentation.…”
Section: Argument Of the Papermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This kind of system cannot function efficiently as long as the mixing of incomparable and often incompatible values makes establishing an axiological hierarchy a difficult task. The acceptance of a humanity/nature [13] ethical dualism raises a problem of systemic coherence [14] in the sense that it can lead to conflict between legitimate duties with regard to the wellbeing of the environment and those, as much as legitimate, regarding the wellbeing of humans. This dilemma can be surpassed if we assume the fact that actions which are just from a moral standpoint must not necessarily have good consequences for their human authors.…”
Section: Arguments To Argue the Thesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This view suggests that reasons to act one way or another depend on facts about what we would do to fulfill our desires or preferences. Environmental philosophers, such as Rolston (2010), have derided subjectivist views for their lack of fit with scientific facts and for the suggestion that although humans emerge from a long evolution of life, they somehow bring all of the value into the world.…”
Section: From Values To Ethicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…: Norton, 1995;Callicott, 1994;1990;Varner, 1991;Stone, 1988;1987). Cette problématique touche notamment l'enjeu de savoir jusqu'à quel point les considérations relevant de l'éthique des relations interhumaines, et celles relevant de Frierson, 2010;2007;Elliot, 1996;Callicott, 1995;1992a;1992b;Rolston, 1994;Miller, 1982). Finalement, une des questions d'éthique fondamentale qui a suscité le plus d'intérêt en éthique de l'environnement concerne la nature des notions de tort et de béné-fice et le type d'entités auxquelles ces notions peuvent s'appliquer (ex.…”
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