Vanguard of the Imam

Anticipating Adversary Military Interventions

“…However, even given this baseline, different leaders may have different tolerances for risk, different attitudes toward the use of force as a political tool, and different preferences about involvement in conflict more generally. 60 One set of arguments focuses on the aggressiveness of a leader's posture toward other states. In the U.S. case, Meernik argues that a president's reputation for aggressive use of force in the past is a strong predictor of that president's willingness to intervene in the future.…”

“…Under this argument, the decisions that leaders make about use of force are generally consistent and even influenced by their past behavior or reputation for use of force. 61 Saunders offers a more nuanced perspective on the role of personality, arguing that leaders across countries and political systems develop worldviews that are either internally oriented (focused on domestic threats and outcomes at home and in other states) or externally focused (emphasizing international outcomes and threats) prior to assuming office. This worldview then influences each leader's costbenefit calculations and decisions about when to use force and when to exercise restraint.…”

“…Finally, Iran has been motivated to intervene to support partners, although it is worth noting that these "partners" have mostly been nonstate actors rather than other states. 60 Iran's fierce independence means that it has only a few close bilateral relationships and no formal alliances or defense treaties that would obligate it to come to the defense of another state. Still, Iran has shown a willingness to intervene militarily to support state and nonstate partners when warranted, with the intervention in Syria being one example.…”

The State Department Designates Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization

“…20 Commentators have questioned whether the designation of the IRGC as an FTO will have any practical impact in view of these prior actions and other Iran-related sanctions , 2019), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-names-iranianrevolutionary-guard-terrorist-organization-and-sanctions-international-criminal (explaining that existing measures are already a "powerful deterrent" and that any prosecutions pursuant to the designation may face significant The measure has also generated concerns about retaliatory actions from Iran and other countries. 22 Previous administrations hesitated in labeling the IRGC an FTO from concern that any designation would complicate U.S. operations in the region and lead other nations to target U.S. security agencies. 23 High-level officials in the Trump administration reportedly opposed the designation due to these fears.…”

“…27 In the spring of 2019, the United States has cut out various exemptions to these sanctions 28 and added still more sanctions targeting Iran's metal sectors. 29 22,2019), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/recognizing-israels-claims-golan-heights-trumps-decision-perspective (observing that "[l]eft unclear [from Trump's tweet] was whether the president was merely calling for U.S. recognition . .…”