Vanité, orgueil et self-deceit  : l’estime de soi excessive dans la Théorie des Sentiments Moraux d’Adam Smith

Abstract

Cet article étudie la façon dont Adam Smith répond à Mandeville dans sa Théorie des Sentiments Moraux sur le rôle de la vanité et de l’orgueil dans la dynamique économique et sociale des sociétés commerciales. Nous montrons pourquoi la vanité prend le pas sur l’orgueil dans son analyse et comment il offre une vision plus positive de ces deux passions. Nous analysons en particulier les conséquences économiques et sociales de l’orgueil et de la vanité, et décrivons les fondements psychologiques de l’estime de soi excessive que ces passions incarnent. Classification JEL : B12, B30.

The Pleasure of Exchange: Adam Smith’s Third Kind of Self-Love

“…94-96). On this moral progress and on vanity as the "typical passion" of commercial society, see also Walraevens (2019). On Smith's conviction that most people are not vain, see Young (1997, p. 47) and Fleischacker (2004, pp.…”

“…26 See also Haakonssen (1981), Witztum (1997), Griswold (1999), Verburg (2000), and Fleischacker (2004) for some of the present positions on the widely debated issue of justice in exchange according to Smith, which will be the subject of a subsequent article by this author. On the importance of the system of natural liberty and free competition for the emergence of the natural price as the just price, see Walraevens (2014).…”

“…Their agreement to our proposal would in itself fulfil our desire for the approval of others (see Force 2003). In this sense, exchange would be sought for the pleasure of having persuaded the others (see Young 1997;Dellemotte 2005;Walraevens 2010). In this article, this "pleasure of exchange" is understood, rather, as the pleasure of having persuaded the others that we really deserve their approval, and thus as the pleasure of having obtained their deserved esteem.…”

“…In particular, it is considered that besides self-love as Mandevillian vanity (or love of praise), two other kinds of selflove are relevant in Smith's thought: self-love as love of praiseworthiness and self-love as love of deserved approval (see also Hanley 2009). 2 Scholars generally consider love of praise and love of praiseworthiness as two kinds of human desires examined in TMS, the latter restraining the former (see, among others: Macfie 1967;Young 1997;Griswold 1999;Fleischacker 2004;Raphael 2007;Hanley 2009;Walraevens 2010;Forman-Barzilai 2010). In this sense, the more or less moderate love of praise would be the lowest and most common form of self-love, while the pure love of praiseworthiness would be the highest and wisest kind of self-love.…”

“…5 Non-tuism is taken as a valid explanation of Smith's exchange not only for scholars who deny any presence of sympathy or imaginary change in position in exchange (such as Brown 1991Brown , 1994aBrown , 1997 but also for those who accept an imaginary change of position in exchange through sympathy and the moderating role of the impartial spectator (see Fleischacker 1999Fleischacker , 2004; see also Fontaine 1997; de Jonge 2012). 6 The parties in exchange that moderate their own desires through self-command (such as in Young 1997;Witztum 1998;Griswold 1999;Darwall 2004;Paganelli 2010) have the other party in mind but only strategically in order to reach an agreement (Fontaine 1997;Fleischacker 2004;Dellemotte 2005;Walraevens 2010), and make "a good bargain" (Wicksteed 1910, p. 180). 7 Accordingly, they are still non-tuist in Wicksteed's sense.…”