Variations in Ethical Intuitions

Zamzow, Jennifer L.; Nichols, Shaun

doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2009.00164.x

Cited by 31 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 71 publications

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“…A third colleague who responded to our inquiry was Shaun Nichols who provided a copy of a recently published paper co-authored with Jennifer Zamzow (Zamzow & Nichols, 2009). The paper includes a report of a pen and paper study in which undergraduate participants were presented with a bystander version of the trolley dilemma in which five people can be saved if a train is diverted to a sidetrack where it will kill a different innocent person.…”

Section: Zamzow and Nichols: A Trolley Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Gender and Philosophical Intuition

Buckwalter

Stich

2010

SSRN Journal

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In recent years, there has been much concern expressed about the underrepresentation of women in academic philosophy. A full explanation of this troubling phenomenon is likely to be quite complex since there are, almost certainly, many factors that contribute to the gender disparity. Our goal in this paper is to call attention to a cluster of phenomena that may be contributing to the underrepresentation of women in philosophy, though until now these phenomena have been largely invisible. The findings we review indicate that when women and men with little or no philosophical training are presented with standard philosophical thought experiments, in many cases their intuitions about these cases are significantly different. We suspect that these differences could be playing an important role in shaping the demography of the profession. But at present this is only an hypothesis, since we have no evidence that bears directly on the causal relation between the gender gap in academic philosophy and the facts about intuition that we will recount. In future work, we plan to focus on that causal link. However, we believe that the facts we report about gender differences in philosophical intuitions are both important and disturbing, and that philosophers (and others) should begin thinking about their implications both for philosophical pedagogy and for the methods that philosophers standardly use to support their theories. It is our hope that this paper will help to launch conversations on these issues both within the philosophical community and beyond.Here is how we plan to proceed. In section 1 we briefly review some of the data on the underrepresentation of women in academic philosophy. In section 2 we explain how we use the term 'intuition', and offer a brief account of how intuitions are invoked in philosophical argument and philosophical theory building. The third section is the longest and most important. It is in that section that we set out the evidence for gender differences in philosophical intuition. We also mention some evidence about gender differences in decisions and behaviors that are (or at least should be) of considerable interest to philosophers. In the fourth section, our focus switches from facts to hypotheses. In this section we explain how differences in philosophical 1 We are very grateful to

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Section: Zamzow and Nichols: A Trolley Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Gender and Philosophical Intuition

Buckwalter

Stich

2010

SSRN Journal

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“…There is, it is true, some much discussed evidence that more confident/strong intuitions are more stable (Wright, 2013(Wright, , 2010. Zamzow and Nichols (2009), for example, argue the defender of intuitions may find some relief in the fact that confidence ratings track the extent to which intuitions are sensitive to order e ects. However, one must remember the nature of the relevant evidence.…”

Section: Which Belief Is Stronger?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Andow

2016

Philosophical Psychology

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Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing e ects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing e ects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the e ect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.

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“…Our intuitions are sensitive to a variety of factors about which we know too little. Intuitions are sensitive to cultural background, gender (Zamzow and Nichols 2009), affect (Nichols and Knobe 2007), personality type (Feltz and Cokely 2009), and contextual factors.…”

Section: Tsu Ch'ung Chihmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction

Frost

2012

Philosophia

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Variations in Ethical Intuitions

Cited by 31 publications

References 71 publications

Gender and Philosophical Intuition

Gender and Philosophical Intuition

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction

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