Variations in the Behavior and Style of State Lobbyists and Interest Groups

Browne, William P.

doi:10.2307/2130891

Cited by 30 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…In these areas, there are only a smattering of studies, and so it's readily apparent that what we know is more speculative than definitive. But this is also true about our understanding of the role of interest groups in more heavily investigated areas- (Bell 1986;Browne 1985Browne , 1987Hrebenar and Thomas 1987, 1993a, 1993bPedersen 1986; and especially Rosenthal 1993 and Thomas and Hrebenar 1991); and general assessments of the influence interest groups and interest groups systems have in state legislatures (Berman 1990;Hamm 1986;Nice 1984;Patterson 1990;Rosenthal 1993, 212-18;Wiggins, Hamm, and Bell 1992; and especially Hrebenar and Thomas , 1992Thomas , 1993aThomas , 1993bThomas and Hrebenar 1990 7. Within the scholarly literature, there are two major conclusions about the influence of PACs on election outcomes.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress

Smith¹

1995

Legislative Studies Quarterly

227

123

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Comparative Legislative Research Center is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Legislative Studies Quarterly. Interest GroupInfluence i n t he U. S. CongressThis essay critically reviews research published in the last decade that explores how lobbyists and interest groups influence the actions of the U.S. Congress. The research is extensive and contains a rich, but often conflicting, set of findings about the influence of interest groups. The purpose of this essay is to inventory, review, and critique this research in ways that convey as clearly as possible the status of our current understanding of the nature and level of interest group influence in the U.S. Congress. This essay reviews research published in the last decade that explores how lobbyists and interest groups influence the actions of the U.S. Congress. Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1980s, the number, diversity, and activity of the interest groups represented in Washington increased dramatically. Some observers of the Washington scene, mainly journalists, argue that this rise in interest group activity fundamentally altered the political landscape in Washington and that interest groups now enjoy far more influence in Congress than they once did. Other observers, mainly scholars of interest groups and Congress, are far less certain about the effects of the rise of interest group activity. They have produced in the last decade a wealth of research that, when taken together, presents a far more mixed picture of interest group influence. The purpose of this essay is to inventory and review this research so as to convey as clearly as possible the status of our current understanding of the nature and level of interest group influence in the U.S. Congress. This essay is a critical review in the sense that it points out various methodological shortcomings in the recent research in ways that cast doubt on the veracity of many of the claims and conclusions of that research. The intent is to indicate some of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing research so as to give a clearer sense of what we do and do not know about interest group influence in the U.S. Congress. A critical review helps make sense of conflicting findings, helps underscore how tentative our understanding of basic influence processes is, and helps define future research agendas.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress

Smith¹

1995

Legislative Studies Quarterly

227

123

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Groups need to maintain access (Truman, 1971;Hansen, 1991), but it is not necessary for influence (Browne, 1985). In this regard, access by necessity is shaped by the institutional context.…”

Section: Institutions Legislative Professionalism and Group Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative professionalism and group concentration: The ESA model revisited

Kattelman

2014

Int Groups Adv

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What drives interest group concentration? Presently, the Energy-StabilityArea (ESA) model provides the basis for explaining the proliferation and diversity of interest organizations both within states and the federal government as a whole. However, while past research argues that institutions have an important effect in generating group mobilization, applications of legislative professionalism to the ESA model are unclear at best, showing either conflicting conclusions regarding the nature of its indirect influence or showing no influence at all. Utilizing an original data set, this study reexamines the relationship between legislative professionalism and group density using the ESA model as a framework. The results show that professionalized legislatures, through their ability to accommodate a diverse set of policy positions, encourage group formation and serve as an additional source of energy within the ESA model. This provides support to the notion that highly professionalized state legislatures employ more outside organizations when formulating policy.

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“…34 D'autres éléments, toujours liés aux conditions sociales mais plutôt ancrés dans un volet culturel, permettent de mieux comprendre les particularités de pratiques du lobbying, d'autant plus qu'ils éclairent les différences observables entre diverses configurations institutionnelles. 35 Bouwen 36 l'a d'ailleurs bien montré dans le cadre de l'Union européenne. Les structures et arrangements institutionnels non seulement orientent les conduites des lobbyistes mais déterminent leur « sélection » selon les niveaux d'intervention.…”

Section: Cadre Conceptuelunclassified

Tensions entre rationalité technique et intérêts politiques: l'exemple de la mise en œuvre de laLoi sur les agences de développement de réseaux locaux de services de santé et de services sociauxau Québec

Contandriopoulos¹,

Hudon

Martin³

et al. 2007

Can Public Adm

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'analyse des politiques publiques (CAPP), Département de science politique/ Département de médecine sociale et préventive à l'université Laval, Québec Daniel ThompsonCentre d'analyse des politiques publiques, Département de science politique à l'université Laval, Québec Sommaire L'objet de cet article est constitué par les processus décisionnels entourant la mise en oeuvre de la Loi sur les agences de développement de réseaux locaux de services de santé et de services sociaux (Loi 25). Nous entendons mettre en lumière les stratégies des groupes ou institutions de diverses natures qui ont fait valoir leurs préférences et ont tenté, avec un succès inégal, d'influencer les décisions relatives à cette réforme majeure de la structure du système de santé québécois. Au plan théorique, nous nous appuyons principalement sur les modèles d'analyse du lobbying qui, depuis les travaux fondateurs de Milbrath (1960de Milbrath ( , 1963, présentent cette pratique comme un processus fondamental d'échange d'information. Selon les données colligées dans les retranscriptions d'entrevues, les stratégies observées correspondent effectivement aux caractéristiques constitutives du lobbying et, dans quelques situations, à celles du patronage. La combinaison de ces divers éléments révèle que la mise en oeuvre de la Loi 25 s'avère être avant tout un processus proprement politique. Ainsi, furent relégués au second plan les arguments techniques qui composaient initialement les objectifs de la Loi. AbstractThis article focuses on the decision-making processes surrounding the implementation of Bill 25, Quebec's Act Respecting Local Health and Social Services Network Development Agencies. Our intention is to shed light on the strategies of the various groups or institutions that expressed their preferences and attempted, with varying degrees of success, to influence decisions with respect to this major reform of the Quebec health system structure. On a theoretical level, we are relying mostly on the models for analysing the lobbying process, which, since the seminal work of Can Public Adm.

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Variations in the Behavior and Style of State Lobbyists and Interest Groups

Cited by 30 publications

References 7 publications

Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress

Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress

Legislative professionalism and group concentration: The ESA model revisited

Tensions entre rationalité technique et intérêts politiques: l'exemple de la mise en œuvre de laLoi sur les agences de développement de réseaux locaux de services de santé et de services sociauxau Québec

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