Varieties of risk regulation in Europe: coordination, complementarity and occupational safety in capitalist welfare states

Abstract

This article tests the extent to which the organization and stringency of occupational health and safety regulation complements the dominant mode of coordination in the political economy. While the UK explicitly sanctions risk-cost-benefit trade-offs, other European countries mandate ambitious safety goals. That contrast appears to reflect cleavages identified in the Varieties of Capitalism literature, which suggests worker protection regimes are stronger in coordinated market economies than in liberal market economies. Our analysis of Germany, France, UK and the Netherlands, shows that the varied organization of their regulatory regimes is explained through a three-way complementarity with their welfare systems and modes of coordination. However, despite varied headline goals, we find no systematic differences in the stringency of those countries’ regulatory protections insofar as they all make trade-offs on safety. Instead, the explicitness, rationalizations and logics of trade-offs vary according to each country’s legal system, state tradition and coupling between regulation and welfare system.

Why Do Countries Regulate Environmental Health Risks Differently? A Theoretical Perspective

“…Second, in the event that countries set out to manage the same risk issue, then differences in the stringency of the ultimate measures can occur. For example, Rothstein et al (2017) found that there are variations in the stringency of occupational health and safety regulations in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. The theoretical frameworks discussed throughout this article could be used, although to different extents, to reflect on these two dimensions.…”

The boundary conditions for regulation: Welfare systems, state traditions, and the varied governance of work safety in Europe

“…Indeed, that story points to important roots of what the VoC literature on mixed market economies (Rothstein et al, 2017;Thatcher, 2007), claims is a diagnostically French (and Southern European) coordination problem between corporatist actors and the state. The result was two overlapping and inconsistent sets of statutory and private insurance rules and two separate inspectorates to enforce them, which has predictably resulted in significant problems.…”

“…First, they were given legal powers to create detailed "accident prevention rules," which to this day are fleshed out by corporatist technical committees in formidably large and dense rule books that are used by Länder Labor Inspectorates and the courts when assessing legal compliance and imposing any administrative law sanctions on violators (Rothstein et al, 2017). First, they were given legal powers to create detailed "accident prevention rules," which to this day are fleshed out by corporatist technical committees in formidably large and dense rule books that are used by Länder Labor Inspectorates and the courts when assessing legal compliance and imposing any administrative law sanctions on violators (Rothstein et al, 2017).…”

“…Thus, the Labor Inspectorate was recently merged with the Social Security Inspectorate to clamp down on fraudulent disability claims and the UWV is now consulted over the corporatist Labor Catalogues so that accident prevention rules take some account of welfare costs (Rothstein et al, 2017). Thus, the Labor Inspectorate was recently merged with the Social Security Inspectorate to clamp down on fraudulent disability claims and the UWV is now consulted over the corporatist Labor Catalogues so that accident prevention rules take some account of welfare costs (Rothstein et al, 2017).…”

Risk and Quantification: A Linguistic Study

“…The close (or even necessary) connection between the concept of risk and quantification, identified by Dean (1999) and others (e.g., Black, 2005;Reith, [2004Reith, [ ] 2009Rothstein et al, 2013) is not empirically supported by the present findings. In this regard, we should note the possibility of cross-national variation, that is, government interest in quantitative "risk-based" approaches to risk has been observed to vary between European countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and France (Krieger, 2013;Rothstein et al, 2013Rothstein et al, , 2017.…”