1 0 1 1 1 2 2 ABSTRACT 1 3A central issue in affective science is whether the brain represents the emotional expressions of 1 4 faces, bodies and voices as abstract categories in which auditory and visual information converge 1 5 3 1 are recognized effortlessly and responded to spontaneously when rapid adaptive actions are 3 2 required. The specifics of the subjective experience in the natural environment determine which 3 3 affective signal dominates and triggers the adaptive behavior. Rarely are the face, the whole 3 4body and the voice equally salient. That is, the actual conditions under which we react to an 3 5 angry face may be different from those of hearing an angry voice or viewing whole body 3 6 movements. For example, we see faces from close by and therefore personal familiarity may play 3 7 a role in how we react to the angry face. This is less so for the voice or the whole body, both of 3 8 which already prompt reactions when seen or heard from a distance while information about 3 9 personal identity is not yet available or needed for action preparation. Thus, the angry body 4 0 expression viewed from a distance and the angry face expression seen from closeby may each 4 1 trigger a different reaction as behavior needs to be adapted to the concrete context. Therefore, a 4 2 representation of affective meaning that is sensitive to the spatiotemporal parameters may seem 4 3 desirable rather than an abstract system of higher order concepts as traditionally envisaged by 4 4 emotion theorists (Ekman P and D Cordaro 2011); but see (Lindquist KA et al. 2012).
5Research on the brain correlates of emotion has favored the traditional notion of abstract 4 6 neural representations of basic emotions and this has also been the dominant rationale for 4 7 multisensory research. Studies comparing how not just the face but also the voice and the whole 4 8 body convey emotions have followed this overall basic emotion perspective and asked where in 4 9 7 1 basic emotions with discrete brain correlates continues to generate controversy (Kragel PA and 7 2 KS LaBar 2016; Saarimaki H et al. 2016). Second, detailed meta-analyses of crossmodal and 7 3 multisensory studies, whether they are reviewing the findings about each separate modality or 7 4 the results of crossmodal studies (Dricu M and S Fruhholz 2016; Schirmer A and R Adolphs 7 5 2017), provide a mixed picture. Furthermore, these meta-analyses also show that a number of 7 6 methodological obstacles stand in the way of valid comparisons across studies. That is, taking 7 7 into account the role of task (incidental perception, passive perception, and explicit evaluation of 7 8 emotional expression) and the use of appropriate control stimuli reduces the number of studies 7 9 that can validly be compared. Third, findings from studies that pay attention to individual 8 0 differences and to clinical aspects reveal individual differences in sensory salience and 8 1 dominance in clinical populations, for example in autism and schizophrenia. For example, (Karle 8 2 KN et al. 20...