Verbs and the Identity of Actions—A Philosophical Exercise in the Interpretation of Aristotle

Penner, Terry

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15418-0_17

Cited by 41 publications

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“…33) Some have insisted that housebuilding involves two different aspects or movements, one of which does in fact contain its end, even though the disputed passage characterizes it as an end-exclusive ἐνέργεια (1048b29-35). See Penner 1970, 440-447, Gill 1980, 136 and Waterlow 1982. While I agree that the agent's activity of building is not in the strictest sense a change, this is not because the activity (in some guise) contains its end.…”

Section: δύναμις In the Useful Sense As A Kind Of Capacitymentioning

confidence: 97%

Senses of Dunamis and the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ1

Anagnostopoulos

2011

Phronesis

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This essay aims to analyze the structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics Θ by explicating various senses of the term δύναμις at issue in the treatise. It is argued that Aristotle's central innovation, the sense of δύναμις most useful to his project in the treatise, is the kind of capacity characteristic of the pre-existent matter for substance. It is neither potentiality as a mode of being, as recent studies maintain, nor capacity for 'complete' activity. It is argued further that, in starting with the κύριος sense of δύναμις as capacity for change, Aristotle begins with the most familiar and acknowledged kind of capacity, in order to move to the less familiar but ultimately more useful notion of capacity for substance, and to bring these two kinds together through an analogical relation.

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Section: δύναμις In the Useful Sense As A Kind Of Capacitymentioning

confidence: 97%

Senses of Dunamis and the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ1

Anagnostopoulos

2011

Phronesis

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“…For the probable origins of the distinction, see Aristotle's distinction between energeiai and kinesis (Aristotle 1984, Metaphysics h6). For extended discussion of the relevant passages from Aristotle, as well as the disagreements concerning their interpretation, see Penner 1970. 6. It is common to speak here of "to remember" as a factive verb, meaning thereby that "I remember that p," like "I know that p," entails "p".…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… For the probable origins of the distinction, see Aristotle's distinction between energeiai and kinesis (Aristotle , Metaphysics θ6). For extended discussion of the relevant passages from Aristotle, as well as the disagreements concerning their interpretation, see Penner . …”

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confidence: 99%

Making Epistemologists Nervous: Relational Memory and Psychological Individualism

Jacobsen¹

2019

Hypatia

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We cannot rethink the ethical and political dimensions of memory—especially its role in constituting persons and identities—without rethinking the nature of memory itself. I first describe a traditional epistemological view of memory, according to which memory is a faculty for preserving knowledge of the past, and then juxtapose a relational theory of memory developed by Sue Campbell. The relational theory is represented in terms of a distinction between actions and achievements; this distinction enables us to both clarify and defend the shift from an epistemological to a political conception of memory. On the resulting view, accuracy, not truth, is the appropriate norm for evaluating memory, and remembering is no longer conceived as an interior process. In the penultimate section I confront an objection to a relational theory of memory—and to relational theories of cognition generally—and suggest a strategy of response.

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“…If we can resolve the problems he raises, we should treat the distinctions as relevantly similar. See also Charles (, p. 128) and Penner (, p. 403).…”

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confidence: 99%

“… There is now a fair amount of consensus that the distinction is not, as was once commonly thought, a merely linguistic one. See Ryle () for this linguistic reading of the distinction, and Ackrill (), Penner (), and Potts () for some problems that arise on this reading. For some recent non‐linguistic treatments of the distinction, see Beere (), Bostock (), Burnyeat (), Heinaman (), Kosman (, ).…”

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confidence: 99%

What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?

Hirji

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that reliably promote an agent's own flourishing, and (ii) virtuous actions are defined as the sorts of actions a virtuous agent reliably performs under the relevant circumstances. I argue that neither of these commitments are features of Aristotle's own view, and I sketch an alternative explanation for the relationship between virtue and happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although, on the interpretation I defend, we do not find in Aristotle a distinctive normative theory alongside deontology and consequentialism, what we do find is a way of thinking about how prudential and moral reasons can come to be aligned through a certain conception of practical agency.

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Verbs and the Identity of Actions—A Philosophical Exercise in the Interpretation of Aristotle

Cited by 41 publications

References 0 publications

Senses of Dunamis and the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ1

Senses of Dunamis and the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ1

Making Epistemologists Nervous: Relational Memory and Psychological Individualism

What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?

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