Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Conjunctive Theories

Cevolani, Gustavo; Crupi, Vincenzo; Festa, Roberto

doi:10.1007/s10670-011-9290-2

Cited by 40 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…6 andGemes 2007, Sect. 7); -short theorems in the sense of Mott (1978), which are also similar to relevant elements, but less fine grained; and finally -literals, which have been suggested by Cevolani and Festa (2009) (see also Cevolani et al 2010), and have been anticipated by Kuipers (1982). This account is restricted to conjunctive theories (see below).…”

Section: Conjunction-of-parts Accountsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account

Schurz¹

2011

Erkenn

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The expansion or revision of false theories by true evidence does not always increase their verisimilitude. After a comparison of different notions of verisimilitude the relation between verisimilitude and belief expansion or revision is investigated within the framework of the relevant element account. We are able to find certain interesting conditions under which both the expansion and the revision of theories by true evidence is guaranteed to increase their verisimilitude.

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Section: Conjunction-of-parts Accountsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account

Schurz¹

2011

Erkenn

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“…20 Carnap's term for mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive predicates, arising from a set of primitive predicates by all possible combinations of negated and unnegated ones. 21 A very general paper also inspired by Cevolani et al (2011), but before realizing the liberating consequences for nomic truth approximation, let alone its room for truth approximation by two-sided theories connecting the model and the postulate views on theories. 22 And less complicated than the connection with belief set revision in AGM-style, as elaborated in Kuipers (2011). nomic truth approximation, suggested above, and a correspondingly refined version of belief base revision.…”

Section: Connection With Belief Revisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Models, Postulates, and Generalized Nomic Truth Approximation

Kuipers¹

2019

Nomic Truth Approximation Revisited

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The qualitative theory of nomic truth approximation, presented in Kuipers in his (from instrumentalism to constructive realism, 2000), in which 'the truth' concerns the distinction between nomic, e.g. physical, possibilities and impossibilities, rests on a very restrictive assumption, viz. that theories always claim to characterize the boundary between nomic possibilities and impossibilities. Fully recognizing two different functions of theories, viz. excluding and representing, this paper drops this assumption by conceiving theories in development as tuples of postulates and models, where the postulates claim to exclude nomic impossibilities and the (not-excluded) models claim to represent nomic possibilities. Revising theories becomes then a matter of adding or revising models and/or postulates in the light of increasing evidence, captured by a special kind of theories, viz. 'data-theories'. Under the assumption that the data-theory is true, achieving empirical progress in this way provides good reasons for the abductive conclusion that truth approximation has been achieved as well.Here, the notions of truth approximation and empirical progress are formally direct generalizations of the earlier ones. However, truth approximation is now explicitly defined in terms of increasing truth-content and decreasing falsity-content of theories, whereas empirical progress is defined in terms of lasting increased accepted and decreased rejected content in the light of increasing evidence. These definitions are strongly inspired by a paper of Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi and Roberto Festa, viz., "Verisimilitude and belief change for conjunctive theories" (Cevolani et al. in Erkenntnis 75(2):183-222, 2011).

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“…The paper is set up by following the cornerstones of any theory of truth approximation as developed in Kuipers (2000) and enriched by Cevolani et al (2011) and Cevolani et al (2013).…”

Section: Outline Of a Theory Of (Nomic) Truth Approximationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Kuipers (2014b) I have shown that the formal definition can already be motivated when a theory is only supposed to claim that it includes all nomic possibilities, and hence that all its non-members are nomic impossibilities. This new motivation is in terms of increasing truth-content and decreasing falsity-content and is strongly stimulated by a paper of Cevolani et al (2011). Formally, it is not difficult to see that the formal definition can also be motivated in a similar way by assuming that a theory only claims that all its members are nomic possibilities (instead of claiming that it includes all nomic possibilities).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Models, postulates, and generalized nomic truth approximation

Kuipers

2015

Synthese

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The qualitative theory of nomic truth approximation, presented in Kuipers in his (from instrumentalism to constructive realism, 2000), in which 'the truth' concerns the distinction between nomic, e.g. physical, possibilities and impossibilities, rests on a very restrictive assumption, viz. that theories always claim to characterize the boundary between nomic possibilities and impossibilities. Fully recognizing two different functions of theories, viz. excluding and representing, this paper drops this assumption by conceiving theories in development as tuples of postulates and models, where the postulates claim to exclude nomic impossibilities and the (not-excluded) models claim to represent nomic possibilities. Revising theories becomes then a matter of adding or revising models and/or postulates in the light of increasing evidence, captured by a special kind of theories, viz. 'data-theories'. Under the assumption that the data-theory is true, achieving empirical progress in this way provides good reasons for the abductive conclusion that truth approximation has been achieved as well. Here, the notions of truth approximation and empirical progress are formally direct generalizations of the earlier ones. However, truth approximation is now explicitly defined in terms of increasing truth-content and decreasing falsity-content of theories, whereas empirical progress is defined in terms of lasting increased accepted and decreased rejected content in the light of increasing evidence. These definitions are strongly inspired by a paper of Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi and Roberto Festa, viz., "Verisimilitude and belief change for conjunctive theories" (Cevolani et al. in Erkenntnis 75(2):183-222, 2011).

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Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Conjunctive Theories

Cited by 40 publications

References 25 publications

Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account

Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account

Models, Postulates, and Generalized Nomic Truth Approximation

Models, postulates, and generalized nomic truth approximation

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