Vices of the Mind

Abstract

This book defends the view that epistemic vices are blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible character traits, attitudes, or ways of thinking that systematically obstruct the gaining, keeping, or sharing of knowledge. An account is given of specific epistemic vices and of the particular ways in which they get in the way of knowledge. Closed-mindedness is an example of a character vice, an epistemic vice that is a character trait. Epistemic insouciance and epistemic malevolence are examples of attitude vices. An example of an epistemic vice that is a way of thinking is wishful thinking. Only epistemic vices that we have the ability to control or modify are strictly blameworthy but all epistemic vices are intellectual failings that reflect badly on the person whose vices they are. Epistemic vices merit criticism if not blame. Many epistemic vices are stealthy, in the sense that they block their own detection by active critical reflection or other means. In these cases, traumatic experiences can sometimes open one’s eyes to one’s own failings but are not guaranteed to do so. Although significant obstacles stand in the way of self-improvement in respect of our epistemic vices, and some epistemic vices are resistant to self-improvement strategies, self-improvement is nevertheless possible in some cases.

Vice epistemology has a responsibility problem

“…Cassam argues for an analysis of epistemic vice that he calls ‘obstructivism.’ On his view, “an epistemic vice is a blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible character trait, attitude, or way of thinking that systematically obstructs the gaining, keeping, or sharing of knowledge” (: 23). Thus, Cassam intends epistemic vices to include character traits, such as epistemic arrogance and closed‐mindedness, but also attitudes, such as prejudice and epistemic insouciance, and ways of thinking, such as wishful thinking .…”

“…Cassam restricts epistemic vices to qualities that are blameworthy or reprehensible in order to avoid counting blindness as an epistemic vice. In his words, “Intellectual vices are obstacles to knowledge, but not all obstacles to knowledge are intellectual vices” (: 3). Some obstacles to knowledge are, instead, cognitive “defects,” such as blindness, and the sort of forgetfulness and inattention that are caused by insomnia (: 3–4).…”

“…In his words, “Intellectual vices are obstacles to knowledge, but not all obstacles to knowledge are intellectual vices” (: 3). Some obstacles to knowledge are, instead, cognitive “defects,” such as blindness, and the sort of forgetfulness and inattention that are caused by insomnia (: 3–4). Note that this marks a difference between obstructivism and the analysis of epistemic vices as ‘effects‐vices.’ Though both of these analyses are consequentialist, effects‐vices are not restricted to qualities that are blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible.…”

“…Both sorts of responsibility require control. Thus, an agent has ‘acquisition responsibility’ for a vice V to the extent that her “past actions, omissions, choices or decisions resulted in her acquiring or developing V” (Cassam, : 124). Whether or not she has acquisition responsibility for V, she has ‘revision responsibility’ for it to the extent that she “has the ability to control or revise [V] by her own efforts” (: 124).…”

On Social Defeat

“…According to some forms of virtue epistemology, it is sometimes appropriate to explain questionable beliefs and other epistemic failings by reference to intellectual character vices. For example, in developing what he calls vice epistemology, QuassimCassam (2016;2019) has explored the way that epistemic vices, conceived of as character traits, obstruct effective and responsible inquiry.…”