Violence and law enforcement in markets for illegal goods

Flores, Daniel

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2016.10.002

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Dengan adanya tindak pidana baru di dalam bidang ilmu yang sedang berkembang tersebut menimbulkan gangguan provokasi, ketenangan dan kerap kali mengakibatkan kerugian materil maupun immateril bagi masyarakat luas, seperti pada beberapa kasus penelitian yang telah dilakukan oleh DeAngelo & Gee (2020); Diantara, Widiati, & Karma (2020); Flores (2016); Lane, dkk., (2020); Peng, Cheng, & Gong (2021). Ilmu kesehatan merupakan bidang ilmu yang kemajuannya sangat pesat di era ini.…”

Section: Pendahuluanunclassified

Sanksi Pidana oleh Tindak Pidana Mengedarkan Simpanan Farmasi Kosmetika Tanpa Izin Edar (Studi Kasus Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Denpasar No. Perkara 491/Pid.Sus/2018/PN DPS)

Pramesuari¹,

Sujana

Sudibya

2021

juinhum

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This study aims to identify and explain criminal sanctions for cosmetic producers or sellers who do not have this distribution license. The type of research used is normative legal research by analysing cases using the Denpasar District Court Decision Case Number 491/Pid.Sus /2018/ PN DPS. This study uses a statutory approach by examining all laws related to this case, conceptually by combining the opinions of experts so that it becomes the author's legal argument, and the case approach is by using a court decision. The results of the study show that there must be elements that indicate that a person has committed a criminal act, and in this writing there are 3 (three) elements that explain that the defendant committed a criminal act. Imposition by the criminal sanction of distributing cosmetic pharmaceutical deposits that do not obtain a distribution permit as regulated in Law Number 36 of 2009 concerning health is regulated in articles 197-201. In this case, the Panel of Judges considered Article 197, namely a maximum imprisonment of 10 (ten) years and a maximum fine of 1,000,000,000 (one billion rupiah). However, the defendant here does not need to undergo the sentence unless later there is another order from the Judge's decision that he has been guilty of committing a criminal act during the probation period has not ended.

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Section: Pendahuluanunclassified

Sanksi Pidana oleh Tindak Pidana Mengedarkan Simpanan Farmasi Kosmetika Tanpa Izin Edar (Studi Kasus Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Denpasar No. Perkara 491/Pid.Sus/2018/PN DPS)

Pramesuari¹,

Sujana

Sudibya

2021

juinhum

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“…given Flores (2016) theoretical result, that if coordinated raids and sweeps disrupt black markets, the disruption may lead to increased violence. Table 7 introduces Rousts an additional independent variable in the homicide rate regressions.…”

Section: Was There a "Rousting" Effect?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Entry then elicited a short-term increase in violence as new and established producers battled over market share. Flores (2016) also adapts a traditional model of Cournot competition between rival producers of an illicit good that can sabotage each other and a government that can punish to raise costs. His model predicts that increased enforcement unambiguously reduces production/consumption and consumptionbased external costs such as domestic violence.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blind Tigers and Red-Tape Cocktails: Liquor Control and Homicide in Late-Nineteenth-Century South Carolina

Bodenhorn

2016

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In 1893 South Carolina prohibited the private manufacture, transportation, and sale of alcohol and established a state monopoly in wholesale and retail alcohol distribution. The combination of a market decline in the availability of alcohol, reduced variety, and monopoly pricing at stateoperated outlets encouraged black markets in alcohol. Because black market participants tend to resort to extra-legal mechanisms for dispute resolution, including violence, one result of South Carolina's alcohol restriction was an increase in homicide. A continuous-treatment difference-indifference approach reveals that homicide rates increased by about 30 to 60 percent in counties that more vigorously enforced the law.

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“…( 2006 ) and Poret and Téjédo ( 2006 ) discuss how criminal organizations, as producers of illegal goods, endogenize their market structures, and the government’s optimal strategy and welfare implications remain uncertain. Moreover, Yahagi ( 2019 ) considers how cooperation among criminal organizations emerges, whereas Flores ( 2016 ) considers competition between criminal organizations as a Cournot duopoly game where they produce an illegal good and sabotage each other to gain a larger share of the market using violence. As a novel contribution, we extend these studies’ approaches to consider how the regional problems for combatting local criminal organizations caused by the difficulties of local law enforcers coordinating their punishment strategies can be detrimental based on local criminal organizations’ relations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic crackdown on organized crime by local governments

Yahagi

Cato

2023

Econ Gov

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This study examines strategic crackdown policies on organized crime between states or nations. In particular, we consider how organized crimes in different regions can affect optimal sanctions for local governments, which face the problem of coordination failure. We demonstrate how the strategic relation between organized crime groups (i.e., complementarity or substitution) affects the strategic relationship between local governments with respect to crackdowns on organized crime. We also demonstrate that if organized crime groups’ activities complement each other, the equilibrium sanction level without coordination is lower than the first-best sanction level with coordination and that if organized crime groups’ activities substitute each other, the equilibrium sanction level without coordination is higher than the first-best sanction level with coordination. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10101-023-00293-6.

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Violence and law enforcement in markets for illegal goods

Cited by 6 publications

References 31 publications

Sanksi Pidana oleh Tindak Pidana Mengedarkan Simpanan Farmasi Kosmetika Tanpa Izin Edar (Studi Kasus Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Denpasar No. Perkara 491/Pid.Sus/2018/PN DPS)

Sanksi Pidana oleh Tindak Pidana Mengedarkan Simpanan Farmasi Kosmetika Tanpa Izin Edar (Studi Kasus Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Denpasar No. Perkara 491/Pid.Sus/2018/PN DPS)

Blind Tigers and Red-Tape Cocktails: Liquor Control and Homicide in Late-Nineteenth-Century South Carolina

Strategic crackdown on organized crime by local governments

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