Virtual Competition

Ezrachi, Ariel

doi:10.4159/9780674973336

Cited by 181 publications

(12 citation statements)

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“…Finally, a more speculative antitrust concern with respect to AI has been put forward by Ezrachi, and Stucke (2016). They argue that firms will deploy algorithms programmed to learn to set prices in oligopolistic competition with other firms and their algorithms.…”

Section: Antitrust and Aimentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence

Agrawal

Gans

Goldfarb

2019

Innovation Policy and the Economy

152

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Thanks to participants at the 2017 NBER Conference on the Economics of Artificial Intelligence and at the 2018 NBER Innovation Policy and the Economy Conference for ideas and comments. We thank the Sloan Foundation for financial support of the NBER Economics of Artificial Intelligence initiative. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w24690.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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Section: Antitrust and Aimentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence

Agrawal

Gans

Goldfarb

2019

Innovation Policy and the Economy

152

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“…Continuous post-merger intervention in a market over a period of time can adversely affect the competitive process. 206 A recurrent challenge with divestitures is significant deterioration of the divested assets to undermine its competitive strength. 207 To solve this problem in the recent telecoms mergers the Commission insisted on an up-front buyer or fix-itfirst remedy.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Four-to-Three Telecoms Mergers: Substantial Issues in EU Merger Control in the Mobile Telecommunications Sector

Tyagi

2018

IIC

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This article addresses the recent four-to-three telecoms mergers in the EU and factors such as deregulation and convergence that have provided impetus to the accelerated pace of consolidation. It seeks to find an answer to the elusive question: what is the magic that ensures the approval of the European Commission, is it the magic of the number of mobile network operators, or does some other factor exist, such as the magic of remedies? While looking for answers this article employs an inter-disciplinary approach, using insights from law, economics and corporate strategy. It emerges that there is indeed some magic: not an individual piece of magic but instead collective magic of numbers, of the relevant market and of remedies. Effective, clear-cut remedies with a structural dimension, as was the case in H3G Italy/WIND/JV, ensure the Commission's approval. Failure to submit suitable remedies, as was the case in H3G/Telefónica UK and TeliaSonera/Telenor, led to prohibition decisions and withdrawal of notification, respectively. The article also criticises the circular loop that the Commission is trapped in -with regard to design of remedies in telecommunications mergers -and underscores the need for a more innovative approach to remedial design.

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“…91 Finally, narrow MFNs do not eliminate competition: they allow for competition (on commissions) between the different platforms. 92 In line with other competition authorities, it is therefore recommended to accept narrow MFNs as a way to safeguard the efficiencies generated by platforms. 93…”

Section: Exemption Under Article 101(3) Tfeumentioning

confidence: 97%

Most Favoured Nation Clauses:

Bostoen¹

2017

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review

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It is often argued that most favoured nation clauses (MFNs) should be assessed on a caseby-case basis given the perceived lack of a coherent theory guiding their assessment. This article asks whether this is the case: do we lack an assessment framework of MFNs under EU competition law? In answering this question, regard is had to both older case law and the most recent developments. Taken together, most of the issues in assessing MFNs do appear to be generally agreed upon. Moreover, legal scholarship complements the theory where the courts and authorities did leave a question open. Thus, it is offered that we are indeed well on our way to a clear assessment framework of MFNs under EU competition law. 8 Commission, 'Commission secures changes to gas supply contracts between E.ON Ruhrgas and Gazprom' (Press release, 10 June 2005) IP/05/710 . 9 Commission, 'Commission closes investigation into contracts of six Hollywood studios with European pay-TVs' (Press release, 26 October 2004) IP/04/1314 . 10 LEAR (n 2) 4.49. 11 Explicitly in all of the aforementioned MFN cases except for Hollywood studios, where it did so implicitly. 12 Andre Boik and Kenneth Corts, 'The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition and Entry' (2016) 59 Journal of Law and Economics 105. 13 This is how Rochet and Tirole, pioneers of multi-sided market theory, described them: Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, 'Platform competition in two-sided markets' (2003) 1 Journal of the European Economic Association 990; they have been described similarly ever since, see eg the recent endorsements by Ofcom, the CMA and professors Clemons, Ezrachi, Strowel, Stucke and Vergoute in House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, 'Online platforms and the Digital Single Market' (Report of Session) 2016, 19.

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Virtual Competition

Cited by 181 publications

References 0 publications

Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence

Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence

Four-to-Three Telecoms Mergers: Substantial Issues in EU Merger Control in the Mobile Telecommunications Sector

Most Favoured Nation Clauses:

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