Virtuous and Vicious Anger

Bommarito, Nicolas

doi:10.26556/jesp.v11i3.112

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 8 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Within this schema, negative emotions such as fear and anger can be felt “both too much and too little” (Aristotle, 1925 , 1106b). In this schema, negative affect in the face of injustice may even embody the virtue of “righteous indignation” (Nicolas, 2017 ). Similarly, Atkinson ( 2013 ) notes that people generally do not endorse an “uncritical” happiness founded on deficient cognitive or affective states, such as lack of care for others.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How participation in Covid‐19 mutual aid groups affects subjective well‐being and how political identity moderates these effects

Mao

Drury

Fernandes‐Jesus

et al. 2021

Anal Soc Iss & Public Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mutual aid groups have flourished during the Covid‐19 pandemic. However, a major challenge is sustaining such groups, which tend to decline following the initial upsurge immediately after emergencies. The present study investigates one possible motivation for continued participation: the well‐being benefits associated with psychological membership of groups, as suggested by the “social cure” approach. Interviews were conducted with 11 volunteers in a mutual aid group organized by ACORN, a community union and anti‐poverty campaigning organization. Through qualitative analysis, we show that participation provided well‐being in different ways: positive emotional experiences, increased engagement in life, improved social relationships, and greater sense of control. Participants also reported some negative emotional experiences. While all interviewees experienced benefits from participation, those who viewed their participation through a political lens were able to experience additional benefits such as feelings of empowerment. Moreover, the benefits conferred by a shared political identity appeared to be qualitatively different from the benefits conferred by other forms of shared identity. The interview data is used to hypothesize an overall process by which participants may come to attain a political identity via mutual aid. These findings have implications for how such groups retain their members and how authorities support these groups.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How participation in Covid‐19 mutual aid groups affects subjective well‐being and how political identity moderates these effects

Mao

Drury

Fernandes‐Jesus

et al. 2021

Anal Soc Iss & Public Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Anger that falls in the bad basket is anger that is misdirected, misattributed, widely spread, abusive, self‐destructive, reflects undue entitlement, and triggers cycles of revenge (Prinz, 2020). For this reason, some philosophers have been careful to differentiate between the good and bad kinds like “vicious and virtuous anger” (Bommarito, 2017; Cogley, 2014) and “deliberate and sudden anger” (Butler, 1897). (I shall return to this strategy in Section 4.…”

Section: Normative Issues: Anger’s Moral Role and Moral Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political anger

Cherry

2021

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this brief essay, I sketch out the philosophical landscape considering anger in general, and political anger in particular. I begin by sketching anger's profile and its relation to judgments. I also consider the role anger plays in moral life. I then consider how philosophers have conceived of political anger, particularly anger that arises in a context of oppression. I survey claims in support of anger's value, as well as debates around its counterproductivity. And I suggest that debates can benefit from taking seriously different species of anger, and the injustices and burdens that are implicit in our forswearing, eradication, or moderation recommendations. I conclude with reflections on recent research and suggestions for future research.

show abstract

“…Nussbaum (2016) puts forward such an argument. But, as her critics note, anger plays an important role as a response to injustice in the world and provides importance information and evidence about injustice (see Bell 2009, Srinivasan 2016, Bommarito 2017, and, most notably, Lorde 1984. For the purposes of this paper, I will just follow the latter's assumptions about the role of emotions in guiding inquiry into injustice.…”

Section: On How We Ought Relate To Each Othermentioning

confidence: 99%

What we epistemically owe to each other

Basu

2019

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The conference has ended, and the organizers have had the forethought to book a number of tables at a nearby restaurant so that conversation can continue over dinner. You're having a good time at dinner and, after a few drinks, you get up to use the restroom. As you return to your table, one of the diners, Jim, attempts to get your attention and says, "Where's my water? I asked for a refill fifteen minutes ago." For a moment you're confused, then it dawns on both of you what mistake has been made. Most philosophers don't look like you. With regard to melanin levels, you share more in common with the wait staff than your fellow diners. Given your skin color, the likelihood that you are a member of the staff rather than a fellow diner was high enough to seemingly make it rational for Jim to assume that you were a waiter, not a fellow diner. The belief that Jim had-and in turn his actions-might amount to a social faux pas, but, given that the belief seems to have been well-supported by the evidence, the belief-and in turn his actwas reasonable. He's not a bad guy; he just made an honest mistake. Of course, in the moment you don't reason through all of that. In the moment, you quickly laugh it off, eager to return to your table and dinner conversation. Later, however, you notice that you can't stop thinking about the interaction, and you wonder why such a small thing is still bothering you. It's not just the act that's bothering you: something about your colleague's belief that you were a waiter is keeping you up at night. This case is borrowed from Basu and Schroeder (2018). 2 One might worry that the truth of these "should" claims requires an impossible (or at least false) thesis of doxastic 3 voluntarism. If our belief-forming practices are involuntary, one might think it futile to make demands on belief. In response to this, I would argue that we are often responsible for beliefs we cannot even indirectly control. It is my view that we cannot believe at will for any reason whatsoever; though we can (and often do) voluntarily select what evidence we look for and how we choose to interpret it and weigh it. I take our beliefs and how we respond to evidence reflects (or expresses) certain evaluative stances that we take. We can, as Pamela Hieronymi (2006, 2008) suggests, exercise indirect long-term control over many of our beliefs by choosing how we engage in inquiry, what sources we look to, etc., and those whom we wrong through our beliefs can properly demand that we evaluate evidence in both epistemically and morally appropriate ways therein developing our epistemic/moral characters. I take it as a datum that an epistemic character is bad or undesirable if it would allow the person endowed with it to come to believe that someone is more likely to be a waiter on the basis of their race. We can demand that all people show more moral care than this with regard to their beliefs about others. Just as we are responsible and can be held accountable for the development of our moral character, I suggest that we are respons...

show abstract

Virtuous and Vicious Anger

Cited by 9 publications

References 8 publications

How participation in Covid‐19 mutual aid groups affects subjective well‐being and how political identity moderates these effects

How participation in Covid‐19 mutual aid groups affects subjective well‐being and how political identity moderates these effects

Political anger

What we epistemically owe to each other

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About