Visual Phenomenology

Madary, Michael

doi:10.7551/mitpress/10796.001.0001

Cited by 31 publications

(17 citation statements)

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“…From PP's notion of representation, a fresh debate has sprung up, about how a PP system's main tools for representational structure, namely probability density functions, can give rise to determinate rather than ‘blurry’ or uncertainty‐seeming phenomenology in perception (Block, ; Clark, ; Madary, ).…”

Section: Predictive Processing and Topics In Cognitive Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

New directions in predictive processing

2020

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Predictive processing (PP) is now a prominent theoretical framework in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This review focuses on PP research with a relatively philosophical focus, taking stock of the framework and discussing new directions. The review contains an introduction that describes the full PP toolbox; an exploration of areas where PP has advanced understanding of perceptual and cognitive phenomena; a discussion of PP's impact on foundational issues in cognitive science; and a consideration of the philosophy of science of PP. The overall picture is that PP is a fruitful framework, with exciting new directions awaiting exploration.

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Section: Predictive Processing and Topics In Cognitive Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

New directions in predictive processing

2020

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“…Madary notes, in this connection, that in visual perception, “there is always the possibility, in principle, of taking a different view on those objects. In pictures, there is no such possibility.” From this he concludes, “Thinking about perception in terms of pictures or images should be avoided because perception involves changing perspectives and is dynamic” (Madary , 69). That strikes me as exactly right.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… “Several people can look at the same image object, but they do not see it from different points of view—nor can they” (Wiesing , 148). By the “image object” here, Wiesing appears to mean what I, following Husserl, have been calling the “image subject.” Michael Madary (, 69) makes the same point, as I discuss further below. …”

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Image Consciousness and the Horizonal Structure of Perception

Hopp¹

2017

Midwest Stud Philos

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“…A more specific constraint concerns the role of retention and protention, which suggest that visual perception consists of cognitive functions of retaining the past content of visual experience and anticipating it in the near future. It was recently argued that these phenomenological constraints are best satisfied by the anticipation-fulfillment (AF) model of visual perception (Madary 2017). The AF model assumes that vision includes constant anticipation and fulfillment (or disappointment) of sensory content as a consequence of self-generated movement (or its neural simulation in the case of an inability to move).…”

Section: Towards Functionalist Naturalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology

Pokropski

2020

Phenom Cogn Sci

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In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl’s phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl’s works and Husserl’s idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences.

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Visual Phenomenology

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

New directions in predictive processing

New directions in predictive processing

Image Consciousness and the Horizonal Structure of Perception

Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology

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