Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis

Abstract

A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availability of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives, and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief‐acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing: it can express stable character traits of the agent, it can be responsive to reasons, and it is compatible with a subjective awareness of the available options.

The illusion of discretion

“…Speci cally, these writers think that when the evidence for p is su cient but not conclusive, it would be rational either to believe p or to suspend judgment on p, and they argue that we can in some of these cases directly execute a decision to form one of these attitudes without any epistemic irrationality. The most recent defenders of this suggestion are Frankish (2007), Nickel (2010), andMcHugh (2013). Nickel (2010: 312-2) writes that: [a] person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it.…”

The Illusion of Exclusivity

“…See McHugh (2011b: 376ff.). Something like this feature is also pointed out by Owens (, ), Adler () and Nickel (); Adler and Nickel use the term ‘adequate’ rather than ‘sufficient’.…”

“…See McHugh (2011b). Contrast Nickel (), who says that evidence is ‘adequate’ when it implies or is reliably correlated with the truth of a proposition, assuming normal background conditions. This is compatible with there being an open question about whether normal background conditions obtain.…”

“…See Nickel () and Nagel () for similar assumptions. Note that this assumption does not commit me to voluntarism about belief, for the same reasons that the denial of exclusivity, a stronger claim, does not commit me to voluntarism (see section 1.C above).…”

“…This appears to be Owens's () view, and may be Nickel's () view. A Pyrrhonian might also endorse this, insofar as the reasons she offers for withholding outright belief are broadly evidential.…”