Voluntary Export Restraints, Profits, and Quality Adjustment

Oh, Joon-Hee; Ries, N C.

doi:10.2307/135895

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Restricted by the quota, the foreign firm extracts a higher surplus from the high-valuation consumers by upgrading its quality. Ries (1993) extends this result to the case of a multiproduct oligopoly. In Donnenfeld (1987), (1989) and Ries, however, quality choice is a short-run variable.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 53%

Quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice

Herguera

Kujal

Petrakis

2000

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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In a vertical product differentiation model under Cournot competition both foreign and domestic firms respond by lowering their investment in long-run quality for a quantity restriction at, and in the neighborhood of, the free trade import level. Average quality increases only when the low-quality foreign firm faces a substantially restrictive quota / voluntary export restraint. The change in quality depends on whether the foreign firm is of high or low quality and upon the restrictiveness of the quota. The imposition of quantity restrictions has important strategic effects on the long-run choice of quality.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 53%

Quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice

Herguera

Kujal

Petrakis

2000

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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“…There are, however, higher quota levels such 27 See Krishna (1987) and Spence (1976). 28 See Das and Donnenfeld (1987), Krishna (1983) and Ries (1993). 29 As in Herguera et al (1994).…”

Section: E Quantitative Trade Restrictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oligopoly and Quality Leapfrogging

Herguera

Lutz

1998

World Economy

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“…Two types of issues are discernible in this literature. One is the quota (VERs) with homogenous or horizontally differentiated goods in the case of duopoly (Harris, 1985;Rotemberg and Saloner, 1989;Gaudet and Salant, 1991;Melitz, 2005;Moore, 2005;and Giacomo and Lambertini, 2007) and the other one emphasizes the effect of quota (VERs), under the vertical differentiation model (Rodriguez, 1979;Das and Donnenfeld, 1987;Krishna, 1987;Ries, 1993;Herguera et al, 2000;Zhou et al, 2002;and Boccard and Wauthy, 2006). Please see Walker (2015) for a complete survey of this literature on the import quota policy and VERs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entry and Import Quota

Tsai

Chiou

2016

Bulletin of Econ Res

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An import quota set stricter than the free trade level is quite common for the domestic entry protection. However, this paper shows that as the products are vertically differentiated, an import quota that is simply set at the original free trade level could be effective on entrant protection. This quota policy also improves both consumer surplus and total domestic welfare, which is in sharp contrast to the implications of existing literature. Our result suggests that an import quota has a stronger protection effect on domestic production if the domestic and foreign products are vertically differentiated.

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Voluntary Export Restraints, Profits, and Quality Adjustment

Cited by 16 publications

References 14 publications

Quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice

Quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice

Oligopoly and Quality Leapfrogging

Entry and Import Quota

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