Voter heterogeneity and political corruption

Abstract

We show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable policies and this ineciency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on. Political competition between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied. In our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmetric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences. Moreover, the corrupt politician can win the majority, as the honest politician tries to trade o the cost of eliminating corruption with its benets.

Voting decision‐making of low‐income consumers: Literature review and research agenda

“…( Mukherjee et al, 2020) Limited capacity to interpret political information and suffer from uncertainty in decision-making (Aragonès et al, 2020 resulting in increased support for the opposition (Burchard, 2020).…”

“…Consequently, they process incomplete information about the candidates (Aragonès et al, 2020). Moreover, despite getting the information through mass media, they trust the information from local politicians or their peers (Keefer & Khemani, 2005).…”

“…Fourth, low-income voters often do not consider the real issues, the party's agenda, the candidate's background, or other traits while selecting a party/candidate (Aragonès et al, 2020). As a result, candidates with a criminal background may often win by resorting to clientelism, intimidation, and information manipulation (Burchard, 2020).…”

“…The poor low‐literate voters have limited access to education (Anderson et al, 2010) and little information about political candidates compared with the literate and affluent voters (Banerjee et al, 2014). Consequently, they process incomplete information about the candidates (Aragonès et al, 2020). Moreover, despite getting the information through mass media, they trust the information from local politicians or their peers (Keefer & Khemani, 2005).…”