Voting on Russia in the European Parliament: The Role of National and Party Group Affiliations

Braghiroli, Stefano

doi:10.1080/14782804.2014.978747

Cited by 22 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Exceptions to these rules have been the Indominable France and Democratic Movement in France, the Free Democratic Party and Alternative for Germany in Germany, the Socialist Party and Forum for Democracy in The Netherlands, and the UK Independence Party. These findings correspond with the prior scholarship, which has found that fringe and hard Eurosceptic parties have tended to be more positive toward Russia (Braghiroli, 2015), but also that in the post-Crimea era, the parties with positive view of Russia tend to be on the far left and far right (Schmitt, 2017;Stéphane & Schmitt, 2015). 4 Similarly, in both Scandinavia and Southern Europe, parties have been on average positive about Russia.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 87%

“…The link between nationalism and positive attitudes toward Russia, which is often raised in relation to the far right (Braghiroli, 2015;Polyakova, 2014;Schmitt, 2017), is not straightforward either. There is no systematic relationship between nationalism as an ideology measured across parties and positions toward Russia, which is reported in Table 1.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the emphases that individual parties put on different agendas may shape their attitudes toward Russia. For example, as Braghiroli (2015) demonstrates, the liberal parties in the European Parliament, which focus on human rights, tend to be more critical of Russia's human rights record. Given Russia's recent attempts to promote itself as a standard-bearer for the cooperation of sovereign countries, traditional morality, and identitarianism, we could expect that the fringe parties that argue that the West is in decay and that the supranational integration has reached too far would be more positively attuned to Russia over time (Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2016;Gressel, 2017;Klapsis, 2017).…”

Section: Partisan Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Partisan views of Russia: Analyzing European party electoral manifestos since 1991

Onderčo

2019

Contemporary Security Policy

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The connection between Russia and European political parties has been in the scholarly and popular spotlight recently. While scholars focus on the connection between the far right (and populist) parties and Russia, they have all but ignored the rapidly increasing literature on the role of political parties in foreign policy. This article provides an attempt to bridge these literatures. After analyzing a corpus of party manifestos, the results suggest that there is temporal variation in how European parties have seen Russia since the end of the Cold War. European parties tended to be mostly positive in their views of Russia prior to 2015. Geography and ideology were much less important as a factor in explaining party positions. While some ideological groups share attitudes across different borders, the overall influence of ideology on attitudes toward Russia is minimal.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 87%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Partisan Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Partisan views of Russia: Analyzing European party electoral manifestos since 1991

Onderčo

2019

Contemporary Security Policy

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“…As this policy also includes fishing in rivers and other variants, the country has some interest in this field, but the main thing of the policy is a link with fishing in the seas. (Braghiroli, 2015) Austria almost always supports the German position in that sense, even when Austria has no interest at all in this matter and could just support other positions. So, the relation between Austria and Germany, obviously very close because of cultural reasons, is also very important inside the Community because it provides Germany, already a powerful state inside the Union, an extra power.…”

Section: Austriamentioning

confidence: 98%

Eu Enlargement to Austria, Finland, and Sweden

Troitiño¹,

Čekerevac²

2018

MEST

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The end of the Cold War meant several dramatic changes in the European integration process. The first obvious consequence was the German reunification and the acceleration of the integration in order to avoid a dominant Germany inside Europe. The enlargement to neutral countries during the confrontation between West and East was just possible because of the end of the conflict. It meant the incorporation to the European Union of three countries strongly united to Western Europe with strong and functional market economies and healthy democratic systems with a long tradition. These three countries contributed to change the EU from a community focused on one specific regional area to a wider union aspiring to entitle the whole continent. The following enlargement to Central and East Europe can be understood as the next logical step after the incorporation of Austria, Finland, and Sweden.

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“…We examine Russia-related questions posed to the Commission as it has been recently shown by Braghiroli (2015) that Russia presents one such nationally salient issue. The analysis of the roll-calls on Russia taken between 2004 and 2012 shows that the MEPs' voting on Russia is determined by both partisan and -though to a much lesser extent -national affiliations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

National or European Politicians? Gauging MEPs Polarity When Russia is Concerned

2016

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The European Parliament (EP) is viewed as a normal parliament. Voting patterns of its members (MEPs) are mainly aligned with transnational political groups, not national cleavages. Yet, it has been proven by many that MEP voting patterns are an outcome of conflicting pressures and a distorted indicator of their individual political orientations. In this study we rely on MEP written questions to the European Commission to measure the policy positions and their determinants. Using the universe of 100,000+ such questions in 2002-2015 linked with MEP country and European Political Group affiliation data, we test whether one issue of high sensitivity to their domestic audiences-Russia-makes the MEPs take their nationality seriously and pay more attention to it regardless of their transnational partisan affiliations. We rely on supervised machine learning to uncover sentiment of every question asked on a negative-positive scale. Then we contrast the sentiment of questions related to Russia with the rest of questions conditional on party and national affiliation of the MEP asking the question. We find that (i) MEP question involving Russia is twice as negative in tonality as an average question, (ii) more variation in modality of Russia-related questions is explained by MEP national affiliation than her EPG. Our findings are robust to alternative methods of sentiment extraction and to controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of MEPs. JEL Classification: F55.

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Voting on Russia in the European Parliament: The Role of National and Party Group Affiliations

Cited by 22 publications

References 27 publications

Partisan views of Russia: Analyzing European party electoral manifestos since 1991

Partisan views of Russia: Analyzing European party electoral manifestos since 1991

Eu Enlargement to Austria, Finland, and Sweden

National or European Politicians? Gauging MEPs Polarity When Russia is Concerned

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