Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker

doi:10.2139/ssrn.757744

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…On the other hand, Issing (1999), among others, has expressed concern about the pressure that national authorities would exert on the members of the ECB council if individual voting behavior were published. This argument is also developed in a formal model by Gersbach and Hahn (2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 78%

“…4 Gersbach and Hahn (2004) show that the publication of voting records may be beneficial if central bankers pursue different objectives. Their findings, however, are reversed in the case of a monetary union, where central bankers may pursue the interests of their national countries (see Gersbach and Hahn 2005). In this case, transparency may lead to increased national outsider pressure and induce central bankers to behave in the interests of their own governments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

Gersbach

Hahn

2007

Soc Choice Welfare

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We examine whether the publication of the individual voting records of central-bank council members is socially beneficial when the public is unsure about the efficiency of central bankers and central bankers are angling for re-appointment. We show that publication is initially harmful since it creates a conflict between socially desirable and individually optimal behavior for somewhat less efficient central bankers. However, after re-appointment, losses will be lower when voting records are published since the government can distinguish highly efficient from less efficient central bankers more easily and can make central bankers individually accountable. In our model, the negative effects of voting transparency dominate, and expected overall losses are always larger when voting records are published.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 78%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

Gersbach

Hahn

2007

Soc Choice Welfare

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“…It makes it easier for national governments to appoint central bankers who have preferences that are in line with national interests, but this might not be desirable for the aggregate monetary union social welfare. Gersbach and Hahn (2005) show that voting transparency can lead to more weight on national, instead of supranational interests, which could make this kind of transparency undesirable when the central bankers' private bene-…ts are relatively high (such that they care more about re-appointments than about bene…cial policy outcomes). In Gersbach and Hahn (2006a) procedural transparency makes it easier to reelect central bankers that are highly e¢ cient (good in choosing the right interest rate), such that the competence level of the central bank governing council is increased.…”

Section: Committeesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey

Eijffinger

Cruijsen

2010

Challenges in Central Banking

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We provide an up-to-date overview of the literature on the desirability of central bank transparency from an economic viewpoint. Since the move towards more transparency, a lot of research on its e¤ects has been carried out. First, we show how the theoretical literature has evolved, by looking into branches inspired by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and by investigating several, more recent, research strands (e.g. coordination and learning). Then, we summarize the empirical literature which has been growing more recently. Last, we discuss whether:-the empirical research resolves all theoretical question marks,-how the …ndings of the literature match the actual practice of central banks, and-where there is scope for more research.

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“…While an increase in transparency can raise welfare by reducing the information asymmetry, strategic behavior could potentially offset the welfare gain if policymakers withhold information during their deliberations in order to enhance their reputations. Gersbach and Hahn (2004, 2005, 2008) model the effects of publishing monetary policy votes and show that the net effect of increased transparency depends on whether the public objective of the voter is sufficiently strong relative to his or her private objective. Meade and Stasavage (2008) model the effects of opening the FOMC's deliberations to public view and provide empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the publication of transcripts made policymakers less willing to voice disagreement with the chairman's policy proposal.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Federal Reserve Transcript Publication and Regional Representation

Meade¹

2010

Contemporary Economic Policy

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" This article looks at disagreement within the Federal Reserve's monetary policy committee, the Federal Open Market Committee or FOMC, following a change in transparency practices taken in 1993 to publish verbatim transcripts of FOMC meetings. Other literature has examined the effects of opening the FOMC's deliberations to public view and provided empirical evidence that the publication of transcripts made policymakers less willing to voice disagreement with the chairman's policy proposal. This article adds to that work by examining whether regional variables are important to the analysis and whether the transcription effects are robust to the inclusion of regional variables. The results indicate that transcription effects are indeed robust, regardless of the regional indicator used, and that larger Federal Reserve districts may be more likely to voice agreement with a given policy proposal." (JEL E42, E58, E65, F33) Copyright (c) 2009 Western Economic Association International.

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Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union

Cited by 15 publications

References 21 publications

Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey

Federal Reserve Transcript Publication and Regional Representation

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