Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation versus repression

Anesi, Vincent; Donder, Philippe De

doi:10.1007/s00355-012-0682-2

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…This framework later became the starting point for a number of additional models, which provided new variations on the economic implications of secession (e.g. Berkowitz, 1997;Bolton and Roland, 1997;Le Breton and Weber, 2003;Lustick et al, 2004;Haimanko et al, 2005;Pech, 2006;Haimanko et al, 2007;Morelli and Rohne,r 2010;Hosoe, 2011;Anesi and De Donder, 2011;Liscow, 2012).…”

Section: Economic Models Of Secessionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Secession: Analysing the Economic Impact of the Collapse of the Former Yugoslavia

Rodríguez‐Pose

Stermsek²

2015

Territory, Politics, Governance

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This paper looks at the economic impact of secession through the lens of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. It uses an econometric analysis covering the period between 1956 and 2011-including a series of factors linked to the independence process, socioeconomic and structural controls, and the level of development-in order to assess whether a) breaking away from the former Yugoslavia delivered an 'independence dividend' to the newly independent countries and whether b) independence had a more favourable impact in richer, rather than poorer territories. The results of the analysis underline that there has been no favourable economic impact of secession and that how secession was achieved is key in understanding the subsequent economic performance of the newly independent countries. In cases of secession without conflict, independence did not have a noticeable impact on ensuing economic performance. Secession achieved by conflict, by contrast, seriously dented growth prospects.

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Section: Economic Models Of Secessionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Secession: Analysing the Economic Impact of the Collapse of the Former Yugoslavia

Rodríguez‐Pose

Stermsek²

2015

Territory, Politics, Governance

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“…There are three typical responses to secessionist threats: one, a policy compromise to prevent the minority region from seceding; two, acceptance of the demand for independence leading to separation; three, fighting separatist movements resulting in armed conflict [Anesi and De Donder 2013]. A peaceful outcome can be achieved only if the majority offers terms which favor the minority [Radan 2007].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public debt and the threat of secession

Molato-Gayeres

2020

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“…Morelli and Rohner (2015) have built a model allowing for both nationwide and secessionist conict, showing that the most conict-prone 7 See also Flamand (2015). 8 Related to this, Bordignon and Brusco (2001) analyze whether constitutions should include provisions for agreed potential secessions, arguing that if peaceful secession is not foreseen, the society may incur ex-post important eciency losses due to conict. Yet, making splitting up less costly makes it more likely to happen.…”

Section: Related Literature and Stylized Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Anesi and De Donder (2013) construct a static model of secessionist conict with an exogenous winning probability; they nd the existence of a majority voting equilibrium with government type biased in favor of the minority. Our contribution is complementary to theirs: our dynamic setting features general transfers and links the probability of victory to group size.…”

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confidence: 99%