Vulnerability and Clientelism

Abstract

This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. We employ a randomized control trial that reduced household vulnerability through a development intervention: constructing residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of Brazil. This intervention significantly decreased requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citizens likely to be in clientelist relationships. We also link program beneficiaries to electronic voting machines, and show the intervention decreased votes for incumbent mayors, who typically have more resources for clientelism. Findings are observed not only during the election campaign, but also a full year later.

Introduction

“…Nichter (2010: 2) defines electoral clientelism as the distribution of material rewards to voters "exclusively during electoral campaigns." This runs contrary to the generic, classic definition of clientelism which typically involves ongoing relationships where politicians (or indeed, other social leaders) provide assistance and benefits not only during elections (Scott, 1969;Bobonis et al, 2017;Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Hicken (2011: 290-294) lists a number of crucial aspects of clientelism, describing it as a form of relationship based on material exchange and involving contingency, hierarchy, and iteration.…”

Political Competition and State Capacity Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico

“…Our paper also speaks to the literature that highlights the negative effects that clientelism imposes on public service delivery and the emergence of credible party platforms that cater to wider groups of voters (Bobonis et al, 2017;Fujiwara & Wantchekon, 2013;Hicken & Simmons, 2008;Keefer, 2007;Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008). Relative to this literature that highlights the relative appeal of particularistic transfers in developing democracies, we emphasize the incentives of clientelistic parties in forestalling investments in the local bureaucratic capacity required for public service delivery.…”

“…In particular, we examine incumbent dominant parties that have a comparative advantage in targeting particularistic transfers to its clients (as opposed to public good and service provision) compared to opposition parties. 1 This set up is of great relevance since clientelism is ubiquitous in developing countries (Baland & Robinson, 2008, 2012Finan & Schechter, 2012;Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier, 2006) and it is often the case that incumbent parties are better positioned to engage in and enforce clientelistic exchanges (Bobonis, Gertler, Gonzalez-Navarro, & Nichter, 2017;Bowles, Larreguy, & Liu, 2017;Larreguy, 2013). 2 Our model highlights that investments in local bureaucratic state capacity that reduce the cost of providing public goods and services undermine the comparative advantage of incumbent clientelistic parties.…”

Election Cycles and Organizations: How Politics Shapes the Performance of State-owned Enterprises over Time

“…As the income of constituents rises, the marginal utility of a given economic benefit decreases (Dixit and Londregan, 1996), and thus the electoral returns of job creation at SOEs should decline with the income level of the community (e.g., Calvo and Murillo, 2004). Third, economic vulnerability and the underprovision of essential services encourage citizens’ participation in clientelism (Stokes, 2005; Bobonis et al, 2017), and politicians can more easily coerce SOEs to boost employment in geographic areas that lack adequate services (e.g., Remmer, 2007). Hence, beyond the direct effect of creating jobs, pushing SOEs to focus on employment in poor and underserved communities can yield large electoral returns.…”